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THE DANGER OF UNDERDEVELOPED
PATENT PROSPECTS
Michael Abramowic4
Commentators have long recognized that much of the work of commer-
cializing an invention occurs after a patent issues. They have not recog-
nized, however, that by the time market conditions make commercialization
potentially attractive, the remaining patent term might be sufficiently short
such that a patentee will not develop an invention to the extent that the
patentee would if more patent term remained. This concern about patent
underdevelopment provides a counterweight to patent prospect theory, which
urges that patents be issued relatively early in the invention process. While
the patent system reduces this risk by requiring a substantial degree of
achievement before patenting, underdevelopment may still be a problem for
some inventions, and in particular, in the field of genomics. A possible solu-
tion is a system of patent extension auctions under which a patentee would
always be allowed to request such an auction, but could win it only by sub-
stantially outbidding third parties. Under such a system, patentees would
call for auctions only when the benefits of ownership continuity, and thus of
continued patent development, are relatively high.
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INTRODUCTION
Those who possess property for a limited time tend to exercise
less care with it than do those who expect to own the property in
perpetuity. For example, an individual renting a car may not treat the
car as well as one might if one owned it. Similarly, in the real property
context, a life tenant has suboptimal incentives to maintain or im-
prove the property while possessing it. Real property law adequately
addresses this danger with the doctrine of waste, which requires that
"the life tenant exercise[ ] the ordinary care of a prudent person in
preserving and protecting the property" and "commit[ ] no acts that
would permanently injure the remainder interest."1 Yet there is one
field of property law in which, although temporary ownership is ubiq-
uitous, courts and commentators have ignored the possibility that
owners have insufficient incentives to maintain or develop the prop-
erty right. This field is patent law.2
1 Life Estate: Termination Because of Waste, REAL EST. L. REP., Mar. 1997, at 5, 5 (citing
McIntyre v. Scarbrough, 471 S.E.2d 199 (Ga. 1996) as providing a useful illustration of the
doctrine); see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 773, 822-24 (2001) (discussing the evolution of the law of waste in the
landlord-tenant context). I am grateful to John Duffy for first pointing me to the analogy
between nondevelopment of patents and waste of real property.
2 While some commentators have considered whether intellectual property law may
tolerate waste, they have not elaborated on the nature of that waste or recognized that the
finite patent term makes the danger of waste particularly severe. See Edwin C. Hettinger,
Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 31, 42-44 (1989) (noting that the incen-
tive to charge high prices for intellectual property might create waste, but not considering
the danger of underdevelopment of the patent right); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntel-
lectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 328-29 (1988) (noting that patent law may risk waste by
not requiring the owner to commercialize the property, but not indicating why such failure
to commercialize is a problem); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the
concept of waste).
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A patent owner receives a patent only for a limited time, namely a
period of twenty years from the date the owner files the patent appli-
cation. 3 Although the issuance of the patent reflects a determination
that the patentee has created a new and nonobvious invention, 4 the
receipt of the patent is not the last step in the process of innovation.
Instead, the patentee must still commercialize the invention in order
to realize profits. 5 This process might include improving manufactur-
ing technologies or conducting further scientific tests. 6 Before a full
rollout of patented products, the patentee will often perform limited
market tests to ensure that commercialization will be profitable.7 In
fact, even after placing the product on the market, the patentee might
still need to undertake marketing and advertising expenditures to in-
form the public about its benefits.8 Like the expenditures that a life
tenant might make to improve real property, these expenditures have
the potential to improve the value of the property right. Just as a life
tenant may refuse to improve the real property in the same way one
who owned the remainder interest would, so too might a patentee
refuse to undertake commercialization expenses that would maximize
the joint interests of the patentee and the public.
Perhaps the problem of patent underdevelopment has received
no systematic attention because the problem is less severe in the intel-
lectual property context than in the real property context. Real prop-
erty often requires continuous maintenance and can benefit from
periodic improvements, while intellectual property, once developed
and commercialized, does not always require the additional infusion
of resources. For example, when a patentee completes the necessary
scientific testing of an invention before the patent term expires, the
cost of maintaining the knowledge produced by such scientific testing
might be negligible. A patent owner who improves owned intellectual
property may also receive an additional reward for doing so. For ex-
ample, when the patentee further advances the patented technology
so as to justify the award of an improvement patent, the patent's life is
3 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
4 See id. § 103(a).
5 See generally F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On the Theoy & Practice of Commercializing
Innovation, 42 Hous. L. REv. 727 (2005) (considering the implications of new institutional
economics on the commercialization of innovation).
6 See, e.g., id. at 735, 752.
7 See infra Part I.A.1; Part II.B.1-2.
8 See infra Part ll.B.3.
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effectively prolonged.9 To the extent that this is the case, patent un-
derdevelopment does not pose substantial concerns.10
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the design of a
patent system is irrelevant to patent underdevelopment. First, if pat-
ent underdevelopment rarely occurs, it may be because the patent sys-
tem already includes protections that help alleviate the problem of
underdevelopment. Some patent systems explicitly penalize
nondevelopment, for example, by imposing compulsory licensing
when a patentee fails to take active steps to commercialize an inven-
tion. " While the United States does not adhere to this approach, the
structure of its patent system indirectly limits patent underdevelop-
ment. In particular, since U.S. patent law imposes nontrivial prerequi-
sites before an innovator can obtain a patent,' 2 an inventor ordinarily
will have already made substantial investments. As a result, complet-
ing the innovation process will require less money than if major inven-
tive challenges remained after a patent issues. In turn, a patentee will
be less likely to decide that it is not worthwhile to spend the remain-
ing, relatively smaller amount necessary to commercialize the patent.
This observation suggests that proposals to grant patents based on
only a small degree of inventive efforts may be flawed and thus pro-
vides a counterweight to Edmund Kitch's famous "prospect theory" of
patent law. 13
Second, even if patent underdevelopment is rare, it might still
pose great concerns within particular technological fields. Even when
the patent system does not directly protect commercialization activi-
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (allowing patents for "new and useful improvement[s]" of in-
ventions). See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 1000-13 (1997) (outlining patent law's approach to
improvements).
10 But see infra Part II.C (suggesting that the finiteness of a patent term might subop-
timally reduce patentees' incentives to make improvements-even patentable improve-
ments-to their inventions).
I I European law permits compulsory licensing when a patentee has abandoned an
invention. See Ronald E. Myrick, Influences Affecting the Licensing of Rights in a Unitary Euro-
pean Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 81, 95-96 (1993). Requiring
outright abandonment to punish underdevelopment makes sense because such a binary
test does not require courts to determine what constitutes "underdevelopment." For an
argument that patent rights should not be surrendered even when a patentee fails to prac-
tice the underlying invention, see F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Prop-
erty: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J.
327, 426-27 (2006).
12 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (delineating the requirements for patenting inven-
tions in the United States).
13 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977). For a brief statement of the prospect theory and an overview of its criti-
cisms, see A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy Grail,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 267, 281-82 (1996).
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ties, it may provide a long enough term for development to occur.' 4
However, it often will be in the patentee's interest to delay commer-
cial implementation until relatively late in the patent term. Indeed,
Kitch observed long delays between the initial issuance of a patent and
the eventual commercialization of the patented technology.' 5 This
observation builds on Yoram Barzel's theory that permitting patentees
to delay an invention may increase private and social welfare.' 6 Al-
though Barzel recognized that delay may also have costs, 17 neither
Barzel nor Kitch recognized the possibility that long delays before
commercialization increase the risk of underdevelopment, or even
nondevelopment, of patents. The patent system encourages delay
when it grants patents on mere "prospects" before commercialization
activity is economical. By the time a patent would be worth exploit-
ing, a patentee in a system with finite patent terms might expect to
recover too small a portion of development costs to justify seeking a
patent.
At first, the problem of patent underdevelopment might appear
to be only a temporary obstacle-if only a few years of patent term
remain by the time a patent is worth exploiting, there is the consola-
tion that the patent will soon fall into the public domain. However,
the prospect of an invention falling into the public domain actually
suggests that the problem of underdevelopment is more serious in the
patent context than in the real property context. While a life tenant
can negotiate with the owner of the remainder interest, with the for-
mer agreeing to improve or maintain the property given some contri-
bution from the latter, similar negotiations are not possible for a
patent owner facing a patent term that is soon to expire. It is impossi-
ble to accommodate the interests of all entrepreneurs who might later
like to commercialize the patent 18 or, moreover, the end users who
might benefit from development during the patent term. Indeed, be-
cause of the potential for free riding, each person who might benefit
from development of the patent during the patent term will have little
incentive to contribute to the patentee's present development efforts.
Moreover, the eventual placement of a patent in the public do-
main does not guarantee that it will be developed. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that scientific testing is needed to determine whether
14 Even Kitch assumes that there generally will be sufficient patent term for commer-
cializing an invention. See Kitch, supra note 13, at 284-85.
15, See id. at 272 (listing numerous inventions' patent and commercialization dates).
16 See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968).
17 Id. at 348, 354-55 (noting that invention might occur inefficiently late because an
inventor cannot capture the full social benefit of an invention).
18 Each entrepreneur hoping to sell or improve the patented product after the patent
term will have an incentive to free ride on the patentee's development activities and on any
subsidy to the patentee provided by other similarly situated entrepreneurs.
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commercialization of a patented invention would be feasible. With
the patent in the public domain, any private party desiring to perform
such scientific testing must also consider the possibility that third par-
ties will free ride on the information its tests produce. If such testing
produces only information but not an invention that itself can be pat-
ented, private actors will have little incentive to invest in it; they will
anticipate that if the scientific testing indicates that the product will
be successful, other competitors will also enter the market. The same
argument applies to commercial experiments, such as market tests
that assess public demand for the invention or for products that might
incorporate the patented invention. Although inventors can keep the
results of marketing tests secret, competitors might still be able to ob-
tain enough information about sales and public demand to determine
whether to enter markets themselves after the original patent term
expires. Thus, incentives to experiment at all, whether scientifically
or commercially, decrease toward the end of the patent term.
Sometimes, of course, first-mover advantages alone will suffice to
spur the development of technologies. 19 But when such advantages,
even in combination with the remaining patent term, are insufficient
to motivate a patentee, third parties might also be unwilling to bear
the expense of commercialization after the patent expires. In other
words, if the patentee does not believe that the value of the existing
patent term is worth the expense of development and commercializa-
tion, it is unlikely that other possible developers would find the ex-
pense justified, unless one possesses some advantage in
commercialization over the patentee and is unable to bargain success-
fully with the patentee during the patent term. As a result, the devel-
opment of some inventions that would be commercialized with a
longer patent term might be diminished or delayed.
How significant is the problem of patent underdevelopment? Be-
cause our patent system is actually not much of a prospect system,20
the problem will likely pose concerns for only a minority of patents-
particularly embryonic patents, i.e., patents on inventions that still
need a great deal of development. Moreover, whether the problem
19 See generally William T. Robinson et al., First-Mover Advantages from Pioneering New
Markets: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 1 (1994) (providing an overview
of the econometric literature analyzing the extent of first-mover advantages). More recent
work has emphasized the possibility that first movers may suffer from some systematic dis-
advantages. See generally Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover
(Dis)Advantages: Retrospective and Link with the Resource-Based View, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
1111 (1998) (summarizing the existing literature and research theories discussing first-
mover advantages). For a discussion of the implication of first-mover disadvantages for the
patent system, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inven-
tions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 708-09 (2001), which notes that second movers often benefit
from a first mover's success.
20 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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will affect a particular patent turns on a variety of factors. The danger
of patent underdevelopment will be less severe where the costs of de-
veloping a patent after issuance are low. The risk will also be lower
where initial requirements for obtaining a patent are more rigorous
since the patentee will be less likely to abandon the project after al-
ready making the required substantial investment.2' At the other ex-
treme, patents on gene sequences and other embryonic inventions
may come at such an early stage in the research process that patent
underdevelopment is of great concern. Patent nondevelopment will
also be more problematic when the estimates of the value of a com-
mercialized patented product are more uncertain and volatile. When
a particular patent will prove worthless absent the occurrence of some
contingency that can make the patented invention extremely valuable,
such as the development of other technologies for which the patented
invention would be a complement, an inventor's incentive is to patent
early and wait to see whether the contingency occurs before sinking
substantial development costs into the patent.
Because the underdevelopment problem applies only to a subset
of patents, any solution must carefully target such cases, lest the cure
be worse than the disease. One possible solution to underdevelop-
ment is authorizing patent extensions. Patent extensions would re-
duce underdevelopment because a patentee considering investments
during the original patent term would be able to realize the benefits
of the investment during the extension period. However, legislatively
authorizing individual extensions to patent terms likely will not iden-
tify the patents for which the social benefits of such extensions exceed
their costs. Granting an administrative authority the power to in-
crease patent terms selectively would encourage considerable rent
seeking, since all patentees would claim that they would invest far
more with a patent extension than without. Indeed, patentees might
have a perverse incentive to limit investment early in the patent term
in the hope of persuading the agency that much commercialization
work remained and that, therefore, an extension is warranted. Conse-
quently, an adequate solution must limit the possibility that patentees
could receive windfalls from patent extensions in order to curtail such
perverse incentives.
In light of these considerations, auction mechanisms form a
promising solution. Auctions limit the windfalls that private parties
can obtain from governmentally granted property rights. Carefully
designing the structure of the auction and the rules governing availa-
bility of auctions could limit patent extensions to those cases in which
21 Requiring commercialization before an inventor can obtain a patent could greatly
reduce this problem, but such requirements would produce considerable costs. See infra
Part I.B.2 (illustrating the benefit of granting patents at a relatively early stage).
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patent underdevelopment is a significant concern. This Article pro-
poses a possible design for patent extension auctions that would limit
their use to those fields where underdevelopment seems likely. In this
system, a patentee could request an auction for a patent extension
before the end of a patent term. To keep the patent, however, the
patentee would have to top the bid of the highest third-party bidder
by a substantial markup. A patentee who calls for an auction and then
loses would be required to pay some penalty. The patentee will thus
have an incentive to call for an auction only where the benefits of
ownership continuity are relatively large.22 Although this Article does
not seek to definitively determine what the markup should be, it offers
a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggesting about 25%. Presumably,
initial experiments with patent extension auctions would involve
much higher markups so that the first extensions granted would be
for patents for which the underdevelopment problem is especially
severe.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I will show how combining
two recent theoretical perspectives on patent law focusing on opposite
ends of the innovation process-one on the time at which patent
races begin and one on the period after patents are issued-helps to
explain the problem of patent underdevelopment. Part I continues
by offering a simulation model that demonstrates both the danger of
patent underdevelopment and the way the patent system indirectly
combats underdevelopment by requiring significant achievement
before patent issuance. Part II offers a tentative empirical assessment
of the degree to which the patent underdevelopment problem re-
mains despite the high threshold for patentability. Although it would
be difficult to design an empirical test to measure underdevelopment,
it is possible to identify the types of patents for which the problem of
underdevelopment is likely to be most severe and the types of devel-
opment activities that patentees, particularly when late in the patent
term, may forego. Finally, Part III introduces the proposal for patent
extension auctions, considering both the possibility that the govern-
ment would decide whether to call for a patent extension auction and
22 Additional rules would ensure that a patentee who values the patent far more than
third parties but not because of the potential benefits of ownership continuity will not call
for an auction. In particular, the auction system would allow a third-party winner at the
auction to sell the patent back to the patentee but only at the end of the original patent
term. See infra Part III.B.2(a). As a result, a third party who recognizes the special value of
the patent extension to the patentee would bid the full value of the patent extension to the
patentee (ignoring bargaining costs). Anticipating this, the patentee would not call for an
auction because, absent some benefit of ownership continuity, the patentee would be una-
ble to pay a profitable markup above the third party's bid. However, a third party will not
factor the benefit of ownership continuity into its bid because the rule preventing sale
during the patent term will prevent the third party and the patentee from reaching an
agreement guaranteeing such continuity.
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the proposal outlined above in which a patentee has the discretion to
demand an auction.
I
A THEORETICAL MODEL
Underdevelopment occurs when a patentee decides not to invest
in development expenses that the patentee would have undertaken
had there been a longer patent term. To simplify the analysis, this
Part will focus on the most extreme form of patent underdevelop-
ment: patent nondevelopment. This occurs when a patentee decides
to abandon a patent that the patentee would have commercialized if
longer patent protection were available. To assess the theoretical dan-
ger of patent nondevelopment, however, one must more thoroughly
examine the patent process and determine how such a situation might
arise. At least two questions ground this inquiry: First, why would a
patentee decline to undertake the relevant development expenses ear-
lier in the patent term? Second, looking still further back in time, why
would a patentee create the invention and apply for the patent so long
before development is feasible?
Each of two recent theoretical works can provide answers to one
of these questions, but a complete understanding of the patent un-
derdevelopment problem combines insights from both. The first
question finds a straightforward answer in Shaun Martin and Frank
Partnoy's "Patents as Options" theory.23 Martin and Partnoy recog-
nize that a patent provides its holder a series of options, including a
litigation option (should a third party arguably infringe the patent)
and a development option to commercialize the invention. 24 An un-
commercialized patent is simply a patent whose development option
has not been exercised. John Duffy addresses the second question by
analogizing the patent process to an auction in which the inventor
who agrees to spend money on inventing earliest wins the right to the
patent.2 5 Thus, inventors might need to engage in inventive activity
and seek patents well before commercialization is possible, lest they
lose the patent race. 26 Combining these insights, competition among
23 Because Martin and Partnoy have not yet released the paper in which they develop
this theory, the summary given here is based on a presentation they gave at Washington
University on November 4, 2005. See Video recording: Presentation by Shaun Martin &
Frank Partnoy at Conference on Commercializing Innovation, held by Washington Univer-
sity School of Law, Center for Research on Innovation & Entrepreneurship (Nov. 4, 2005)
[hereinafter Martin & Partnoy Presentation] (available at http://law.wustl.edu/CRIE/
videos/CI 1.4-5.06/03martinpartnoy.ram).
24 See id.
25 SeeJohn F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 439, 445
(2004).
26 See id.
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inventors forces patenting at an early stage-often so early, in fact,
that patentees are unsure whether exercising the patent's develop-
ment option will ever be worthwhile.
This analysis can help answer a longstanding puzzle about the
patent system: why so many patents go unlicensed and thus appear to
be worthless.27 While a partial answer to the puzzle is likely that pat-
ent acquisition serves a signaling function, 28 that might not be the
entire story.29 Perhaps an additional answer is that many patentees
obtain patents for their option value and then frequently fail to de-
velop the patents due to lack of profitability under the limited patent
grant.30 This possibility is disturbing not only because the patent pro-
cess itself is expensive, 3' but also because of the possibilities of
nondevelopment or underdevelopment of an invention. Though one
might assume that uncommercialized patents are not worth commer-
cializing, and thus that the private loss associated with worthless pat-
ents is of relatively little social significance, it is only truly safe to
assume that uncommercialized patents are not worth commercializing
given the limited patent grant. If patentees abandon patent rights when
term extensions would lead to commercialization-and thus to both
private and social benefits-then the patent system may be failing to
optimize social welfare compared to a system in which it would be
more difficult to obtain patents when the possibility of commercializa-
tion is uncertain.
27 Mark Lemley roughly estimates that only about five percent of issued patents are
ever licensed. Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1495, 1507 (2001).
.28 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 645-46, 648-49 (2002) (ar-
guing that because the number of patents a firm obtains correlates with less measurable
attributes of a firm that are of interest to potential investors, firms may even choose to
acquire patents with little economic value).
29 For a critique of the signals hypothesis, see Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wag-
ner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2005).
30 Commentators before Martin and Partnoy likened a patent to a stock option in that
it may or may not be exercised or developed. See F. Russell Denton & PaulJ. Heald, Ran-
dom Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1175, 1194-95 (2003). Commentators have also analogized patents to lottery tick-
ets. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using Statistical Survival
Analysis to Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317, 328 n.30 (2002); F.M. Scherer,
The Innovation Lottey, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. INNOVA-
TION POLICY POR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETv 3, 4-7, 15 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds.,
2001) (observing that patent returns may fit a Pareto distribution, which has a longer and
thicker tail than a log normal distribution, and thus that owning large patent portfolios
may not entirely diversify risk). Such analogies and observations underscore the concep-
tion that patent holders have the option to develop patents as they see fit and may thus
choose not to develop the patents at all. These commentators have not, however, noted
that the option characteristics of patents may lead to their acquisition at such an early time
as to inhibit development within the patent term.
31 See Lemley, supra note 27, at 1498-99 (estimating the cost of a patent prosecution
to be between $10,000 and $30,000 per patent).
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Part L.A elaborates on these works, and Part 1.B reports the result
of a simulation that incorporates an insight inherent in the Martin
and Partnoy analysis into a numerical example that Duffy employed to
illustrate his model. Although neither Martin and Partnoy nor Duffy
recognize that our system of finite patent terms produces the danger
of patent nondevelopment,3 2 an appreciation of the central insights of
both brings to light that the problem is more worrisome than either
analysis taken alone would suggest. While Duffy ignores patent
nondevelopment because he assumes that the costs and benefits of
patenting are known in advance,33 Martin and Partnoy do so because
they disregard how competition among patent racers may lead to ac-
quisition of patents long before commercialization becomes feasi-
ble.3 4 A dynamic model incorporating uncertainty shows how patent
nondevelopment can become a danger and how the patent system can
limit this danger.
A. Options and Auctions
1. Patents as Options
The central observation underlying the Martin and Partnoy analy-
sis is that the future is always uncertain. 35 Someone who owns a pat-
ent cannot be sure how profitable commercialization of the patent
will be or even how much it will cost to complete the commercializa-
tion process. The future, however, tends to become clearer as we
move toward it. It therefore sometimes makes sense to wait before
irreversibly investing substantial resources in developing a patent
whose value is currently uncertain. A central observation of "real op-
tions theory"3 6 is that part of an option's value is the right to wait for
more information about whether the option will be worth exercis-
32 See Duffy, supra note 25; Martin & Partnoy Presentation, supra note 23. In a subse-
quent article (written after Duffy read a draft of this Article), Duffy recognizes the
nondevelopment problem. See John F. Duffy, Embryonic Patents: Prospects, Prophesies
and Pedis Possessio (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Duffy notes that
patent law tries to avoid the problem through the "abandoned experiment" doctrine,
which excludes abandoned experiments from the prior art and thus allows others to obtain
patents on the technology. See id. at 33-35. The doctrine, however, does not apply to a
technology that is patented prior to abandonment, and so it does not address the patent
nondevelopment problem. Duffy also suggests that patent law might allow a third party to
repatent the commercialized realization of an abandoned patented invention. See id. at
36-38. As Duffy recognizes, however, "[c]urrent U.S. patent law has no clear doctrine
permitting" such repatening. Id. at 36.
13 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 465-66.
34 See Martin & Partnoy Presentation, supra note 23.
35 See id.
36 See generally REAL OPTIONS AND INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: CLASSICAL READ-
INGS AND RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS (Eduardo S. Schwartz & Lenos Trigeorgis eds., 2001)
(containing many important contributions to the field).
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ing.37 Indeed, in most contexts, there would be no reason to
purchase an option over the underlying asset if it is apparent at the
time of the purchase that it will later make sense to exercise the op-
tion. Because a patent functions as an option or as a series of options,
part of its value lies in the right of the patent owner to wait for the
optimal moment to decide whether to exercise those options.38 While
such waiting is optimal for the patentee, it increases the risk of patent
nondevelopment and may be suboptimal for social welfare.
The increase in value of a patent based on a holder's right to
forestall development is substantially due to the possibility of new in-
formation about the patent's potential profitability. By waiting an ad-
ditional year before making a decision to initiate the development
process, a patentee loses a year of potential profits but gains the possi-
bility of greater certainty about the potential profitability of commer-
cialization. Suppose, for example, that it will cost $1 million to
commercialize a patent with twenty years remaining and that the pat-
entee believes that there is a 50% chance of a good result-a product
worth $2 million in present discounted value-and a 50% chance of a
bad result-a product worth nothing. For simplicity, assume risk neu-
trality and that each year of the patent term would contribute equally
to the present discounted value because revenues will increase in
value at the same rate as the discount rate. The decision whether to
commercialize appears to be a close one, and if waiting were impossi-
ble, the patent would effectively be worth nothing.
Waiting a year to commercialize the patent means that, absent
new information, the good result scenario will provide only
$1,900,000 because of the lost year of sales. Suppose, however, that
the patentee expects new information to arise in that year of waiting.
Further suppose a 50% chance that this information will indicate that
the good result is now 60% likely and a 50% chance that this informa-
tion will indicate that the good result is now 40% likely. Then the
patentee should wait. By waiting, the patent has an expected value of
0.5 x 0.6 x ($1,900,000 - $1,000,000) + 0.5 x 0.4 x $0 = $270,000. The
right to delay by one period thus increases the expected value of the
patent from $0 to $270,000.
37 See, e.g., Avinash Dixit, Investment and Hysteresis, in REAL OPTIONS AND INVESTMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY- CLASSICAL READINGS AND RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 36, at
153, 154; Robert McDonald & Daniel Siegel, The Value of Waiting to Invest, in REAL OPTIONS
AND INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: CLASSICAL READINGS AND RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS,
supra note 36, at 253-54.
38 See Martin & Partnoy Presentation, supra note 23 (discussing patents as including
the options to abandon the patent or delay development). The numerical example in the
following paragraph also concretely illustrates how the right to wait until the optimal mo-
ment to develop a patent increases a patent's value.
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It will rarely be obvious at the time a patent is issued exactly how
long the patentee should wait before making a decision about com-
mercialization. At each time period, the patentee will recognize that
it may be worth waiting until the next time period before fully devel-
oping the patent. In the interim, the patentee might undertake some
limited development or experimentation to better assess whether ad-
ditional tentative steps or full-fledged development efforts are finan-
cially justified. It might appear that the finiteness of the patent term
would reduce the patentee's incentive to wait relative to a hypothetical
world of infinite patent terms; after all, in our own lives, deadlines
make us move more quickly. The analogy, however, does not strictly
apply. The economic decision to wait an additional time period de-
pends on the possibility that new information might develop com-
pared to the value of lost sales attributable to delay. In the end, a
rational patentee will not necessarily hurry because of the finite patent
term. Finiteness limits delay only to the extent that confining the pat-
ent to a particular term may limit uncertainty.
The finiteness of the patent term, however, does significantly af-
fect the patentee's incentives: it makes it much more likely that the
patentee will eventually abandon the patent altogether. As Martin
and Partnoy recognize and the numerical example above reinforces,
the right to abandon a patent and save the money that would other-
wise fund development of that patent increases the value of the patent
right.39 Although Martin and Partnoy worry that patentees will some-
times find the litigation option more attractive than the development
option, 40 they do not make the broader point that even absent a right
to litigate without developing a patent, the amount of development
activity itself might be inadequate from a social welfare perspective.
Martin and Partnoy identify solutions that focus on reducing the value
of litigation options by increasing the exercise price of those op-
tions.41 For example, a fee-shifting regime for patent litigation might
discourage patentees from filing frivolous litigation. 42 These solutions
might be worth considering because the availability of attractive op-
tions such as the litigation option reduces the probability that the pat-
entee will exercise the development option. However, one should
also consider other approaches to addressing patent
nondevelopment.
An alternative approach that might appear sensible would be to
increase the length of the original patent term. Patent nondevelop-
ment, after all, is a result of the finite nature of the patent term. With
39 See Martin & Partnoy Presentation, supra note 23.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id.
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an infinite patent term and negligible costs of maintaining a patent, a
currently undeveloped patent might prove valuable in the future. In-
deed, because economies grow over time, patents with infinite terms
should become more valuable over time as well, unless substitutes for
the patented technologies are developed in the interim. Therefore,
the danger of nondevelopment might appear to produce an argu-
ment for systematically longer patent terms than would otherwise be
optimal. To assess the potential effects of longer patent terms, we
must turn to John Duffy's model of the patent system as an auction, a
model that counterintuitively counsels in favor of increasing the pat-
ent term even in the absence of a direct concern about patent
nondevelopment. 43 Ironically, we will see that the concern about pat-
ent nondevelopment ultimately complicates Duffy's approach.
2. Patents as Auctions
While Martin and Partnoy consider the incentives of inventors
who have already received patents, Duffy focuses on the incentives of
inventors who race against one another in competition for the pat-
ent.44 Earlier commentators noted the similarity between races and
auctions in contexts including patent law, 45 but they ignored an as-
pect of this analogy that is crucial to patent policy. A race, the earlier
scholars realized, amounts to an "all-pay" auction in which each par-
ticipant must pay the amount of its bid at the auction's end, and par-
ticipants with higher bids have greater chances of winning.46 This
analysis tends to assume that patent races are like races at track meets
in which all racers start only when the gun goes off.4 7 Duffy's insight
is that inventors can improve their "bids" and thus their chances of
winning the race by committing resources at an earlier time.48 The
patent race is thus more like a treasure hunt in which each contestant
may start at any time, and those who drag themselves out of bed to
start the hunt earlier have an advantage over the others. As this hunt
would end earlier than one in which the starting time was fixed, so too
would a patent race end earlier when participants are welcome to be-
gin racing whenever they please.
43 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 493-96.
44 See generally id. (discussing various theories explaining patent races, their outcomes,
and the social utility of the patent system).
45 See, e.g., Wolfgang Leininger, Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations, 33 J.
CoNFLicr RESOL. 231, 233 (1989).
46 See id.; see also Michael R. Baye et al., Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the
All-Pay Auction, 83 Am. ECoN. REv. 289 (1993) (providing an additional application of the
all-pay auction model).
47 See sources cited supra note 46.
48 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 443-45 (discussing patentees' incentives to invest in
patents as early as possible to gain exclusive rights to the invention).
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Because the patent term is finite, inventors are racing not only to
be the first to obtain a patent but also, in effect, to place the invention
into the public domain at the earliest possible time.49 As a result, the
patent race provides a benefit to society, and because of this Duffy
analogizes it to a Demsetzian auction. 5°1 In 1968, Harold Demsetz ar-
gued that instead of directly regulating the prices monopolists
charged and the quality of services they provided, the government
might instead hold an auction for the right to be a monopolist and
award the franchise to the bidder who commits to the best price-qual-
ity package. 5' Similarly, the government awards a patent to one of the
inventors who begins the race first,52 thus agreeing to commit the in-
vention to the public at the earliest possible time. If the auction is
competitive, the Demsetzian approach to monopoly regulation pushes
down participants' returns to zero economic profit.53 So too can the
implicit patent auction lead inventors to start racing at a point when
they will earn no economic profit from doing so.54
The model of patents as Demsetzian auctions makes the patent
nondevelopment problem more severe. To the extent that patent
races push patenting to a very early stage, the risk that it will not be
worth exercising the patent development option increases. Duffy
does not recognize the danger of patent nondevelopment because he
assumes that the costs and benefits of patenting are certain. 55 In the
absence of uncertainty, an inventor would never expend the substan-
tial resources required to patent an invention and then fail to com-
mercialize it. Uncertainty, however, makes it apparent that patents
are options, and so long as there is some chance that the option will
be worth exercising, an inventor may have an incentive to seek a pat-
ent. Moreover, an inventor will sometimes be willing to enter a patent
race very early because of the possibility that an invention will be more
valuable than expected. 56 Thus, an inventor might obtain a patent
fully expecting that the patent term will not be long enough to allow
49 See id. at 493-96.
50 See id. at 475-80; see also Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55,
63 (1968).
51 See Demsetz, supra note 50.
52 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 443-44. Duffy recognizes that research is probabilistic,
and in extending his model, he assumes that inventors will only have some probability in
each period of successfully meeting the requirements for patentability. See id. at 480-83.
53 See id. at 477 ("Where patent rights are limited in time, a competition to patent
earlier will resemble a Demsetzian auction in that, by trying to be first to patent, the com-
peting inventors are also vying to diminish their rents by placing the patent in the public
domain sooner.").
54 See id. at 481 (assuming that "firms' expected profits are zero").
55 See id. at 465-66 (making assumptions about the costs and benefits of patenting
without allowing for uncertainty).
56 See id. at 466 (" [P] rivate firms race to capture the rewards implicit in a patent grant.
If the rewards are too great ... then the firms will 'over-race' . .. ).
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development of the patent, but betting on a small chance that the
patent might be worth pursuing within the patent term.
Adding uncertainty to Duffy's model or early patenting to the
Martin and Partnoy framework not only makes the patent
nondevelopment problem more severe than it would otherwise seem,
but also makes an appropriate solution more elusive. Part I.A.1 has
already shown that Martin and Partnoy's analysis seems to support a
proposal to lengthen patent terms.57 Interestingly, in a separate arti-
cle, Duffy also argues for longer patent terms.58 While lengthening
the patent term might seem likely to delay the introduction of inven-
tions into the public domain, instead it makes acquiring patents more
attractive and thus leads to invention at an earlier time. Under cer-
tain assumptions in one of Duffy's mathematical models, this in-
creased incentive effect dominates the delay effect-at least if the
lengthening of the patent term is announced early enough to allow
patent racers to respond by entering the patent races earlier.59
Lengthening the patent term thus leads to inventions being commit-
ted to the public domain at an earlier time. 60 Duffy's analysis reverses
the ordinary intuition: Longer (but nonretroactive 6 ) patent terms
will not benefit inventors as a class because more will compete and in
turn drive down profits, but they will benefit the public because inven-
tions will fall into the public domain sooner.62
Longer patent terms might also appear to alleviate patent
nondevelopment, but this is uncertain. If longer patent terms in fact
result in patents entering the public domain even earlier, then it may
never become worthwhile to exercise a development option that oth-
erwise would have been worth exercising. There are, again, two com-
peting effects. On the one hand, the longer patent term means that if
commercialization occurs relatively early, there will be more time peri-
ods in which the inventor can reap the benefits of commercialization,
and the incentive to exercise the development option at some point
before patent expiration will be greater. On the other hand, earlier
invention might not mean earlier commercialization, and the effective
patent term might be shorter. Assuming that increasing the length of
57 See supra Part I.A.1.
58 SeeJohn F. Duffy, A Minimum Optimal Patent Term (Jan. 9, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=354282) (offering a model sug-
gesting that an optimal patent term is at least as long as the existing patent term).
59 See id. at 4 ("The increased patent term causes innovation to occur earlier but the
change in the time of innovation is less than the increase in patent term.").
60 See id.
61 Duffy has argued against providing windfall retroactive term extensions for intellec-
tual property rights. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
62 See Duffy, supra note 58, at 29-31; Duffy, supra note 25, at 494-96.
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the patent term only affects the particular invention at issue,6" increas-
ing the length of the original patent term would not change the par-
ticular year in which it will make sense to commercialize a patent. But
after that year, there will be fewer years remaining in the patent term,
and if the longer patent term indeed made the date at which the in-
vention enters the public domain earlier, there will be less incentive to
exercise the development option. This story suggests there is a trade-
off in a longer patent term, though different from the one between
static and dynamic efficiency that scholars have long imagined. 64
Rather, a longer patent term can lead to some inventions entering the
public domain earlier, but it can also lead to a greater number of
abandoned inventions. There might well be other, more complicated
stories,65 but ultimately the welfare effects of systematic patent term
extensions appear quite complicated.
B. A Re-Rethinking of Prospect Theory
Even if the problem of patent nondevelopment does not justify a
longer patent term, patent term extensions might still be useful on a
case-by-case basis if their availability could be limited to those particu-
lar patents subject to a risk of nondevelopment. Part III will consider
whether this approach is feasible. The combination of the Martin and
Partnoy approach 66 and the Duffy approach, 67 however, points to a
different possible solution: increasing the minimum threshold for pat-
entability and thus decreasing the proportion of commercialization
and invention expenditures needed after a patent issues. Though
concerned that the patent litigation option might be too attractive in
comparison to the patent development option, Martin and Partnoy do
not consider this approach, perhaps because they implicitly assume
63 This assumption might be unjustified. For example, it might not make sense to
commercialize a particular invention until another, complementary invention is devel-
oped. However, increasing the length of the patent term could also lead to earlier devel-
opment of that invention.
64 See generally WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE 76-86
(1969) (providing the leading account of the competing effects of a longer patent term).
65 For instance, if inventors anticipate that they will be unable to commercialize their
inventions until a particular date, precisely the opposite result may occur: a reduced risk of
nondevelopment, but a delayed introduction of the invention into the public domain.
Suppose that it will not be feasible to commercialize a particular invention, not yet created,
until the year 2025. Suppose further that under the existing patent system, invention and
patenting would occur in 2015, and the patent therefore would expire in 2035. If the
patent term is lengthened by five years, but commercialization still cannot occur until
2025, invention will take place no earlier than 2010 with patent expiration still occurring in
2035. Because the invention will likely be more expensive to create in 2010 than in 2015,
at least in present discounted value terms, invention is likely to occur after 2010-say,
perhaps, in 2011. As a result, the patent will expire in 2036.
66 See Martin & Partnoy Presentation, supra note 23; supra Part I.A.1.
67 See Duffy, supra note 25; supra Part I.A.2.
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that the dates of invention and patenting are fixed.68 In Rethinking the
Prospect Theory of Patents, however, Duffy considers the issue directly
but ends up offering the opposite recommendation: that patents
should be granted at a very early stage when they are mere patent
prospects. 69
Yet, Duffy's recommendation might not be sound once one con-
siders patent nondevelopment, because the prospect approach in-
creases the risk of nondevelopment. A theoretical appreciation of
patent nondevelopment is important not only because reforms pro-
posing to combat it could improve the efficiency of the patent system
but also because unrelated reforms that fail to recognize nondevelop-
ment could further aggravate the problem. Moreover, the patent sys-
tem to some extent already takes the nondevelopment concern into
account, whether surreptitiously or not, by requiring substantial
achievement before issuing patents. Consideration of patent
nondevelopment thus provides a richer positive explanation for the
patent system's standard of patentability.
To understand how concerns about patent nondevelopment
might counsel against the prospect theory, we must first understand
how Duffy's recognition that the time of invention is endogenous to
the patent system supports the prospect approach. 70 If obtaining a
patent requires only minor inventive efforts, the patent race will be
shorter.7' This means that each participant in the race stands to lose
less money if someone else receives the patent.72 Inventors will antici-
pate that the length of the patent race will be shorter and thus that
the amount of money sunk by those who lose the patent race will be
smaller. 73 Thus, the expected cost of racing is lower, and inventors
will begin racing earlier than they otherwise would.74 This analysis
provides an important new defense of the patent prospect approach.
Even if, as some commentators have suggested, 75 inventive activity will
develop more rapidly if inventors are racing against one another, it
68 See Martin & Partnoy Presentation, supra note 23.
69 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 471-72 (illustrating the thesis).
70 See id. at 465-75.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 908 (1990) ("Public policy.., ought to encourage inventive
rivalry, and not hinder it.... [A] rivalrous structure surely has its inefficiencies. But such
a structure . . . seems a much better social bet than a regime where only one or a few
organizations control the development of any given technology."); see also Mark A. Lemley,
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CmI. L. REV. 129, 141-42
(2004) (concluding that the empirical literature supports the proposition that research will
progress faster when no initial inventor is able to control it); Tim Wu, Intellectual Property,
Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REv. 123, 127-31 (2006) (arguing that de-
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still might be useful for patent law to declare winners to races quickly
because the promise of a quick end to the race will make the race start
earlier. While the original basis of Kitch's prospect theory was that
issuing early and broad patents provided useful ex post incentives, for
example by allowing inventors to better coordinate inventive activity,7"
Duffy's argument suggests that the prospect approach offers benefits
before the patent is issued. 77
The debate over prospect theory is central to assessing how high
the hurdle for patentability ought to be, and Duffy's contribution
helps to demonstrate that concerns about wasteful duplication of ef-
fort should matter even to those who adhere to the traditional reward
approach to patent law. Wasteful duplication matters not only be-
cause it suggests that resources are being diverted from other activi-
ties, but also because the prospect of such duplication will discourage
research in the first place.
Nonetheless, the concern about patent nondevelopment provides
a countervailing concern that questions the wisdom of imposing low
hurdles for patentability. Imposing minimal requirements for ob-
taining a patent will decrease both the price of the patent option and
the chance that the option will never be exercised. To the extent that
the patent system acts as an auction for a reduced patent term,,it
might advance social welfare by accelerating the entry of an invention
into the public domain, but it also might reduce social welfare by in-
creasing the risk that an inventor will not .develop or commercialize it.
Duffy's analysis ultimately highlights why nondevelopment of pat-
ents might be an even more serious problem than waste in the real
property context.7 8 If the patent process functions as a declining-term
auction, then effective patent terms might be quite short. Inventors
will not seek patents if they know for certain that, by the time they
complete development, there will not be sufficient term remaining to
allow them to recoup their costs. But, the expected net benefits of
development might change after a patent is issued, and a project that
initially appeared likely to be profitable might become unprofitable.
Moreover, the possibility that the expected net benefits will rise might
lead inventors to obtain patents very early for their option value, even
when it seems likely that developing them will never be profitable.
centralized decisionmaking, as occurs in the absence of patent protection, might produce
more breakthrough inventions).
76 See Kitch, supra note 13, at 276 ("[A] patent 'prospect' increases the efficiency with
which investment in innovation can be managed. ... [T]he patent owner [is] in a position
to coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the patent's value
so that duplicative investments are not made .
77 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 465-75.
78 See supra note I and accompanying text (discussing how real preperty law addresses
the problem of waste).
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To make these points more formally, I will begin with a numeri-
cal example that Duffy uses to explain his case,7 9 and I will then show
how adding uncertainty to the model might alter Duffy's conclusions.
In the numerical example, a single firm will obtain a patent during
the first year in which obtaining the patent would produce positive
rents, recognizing that if it did not incur the costs necessary to obtain
the patent in that year, another firm would.80 The invention produces
social benefits that grow at an annual rate of 5%, reaching $10 per
year in 2010 and higher levels beyond. 81 The cost of the invention is
$100 in the year in which the invention occurs, but continuing with
Duffy's numbers, a prospect patent costs only $1 in the year it is ob-
tained with the invention then costing $99 to complete in the year of
invention.8 2 Finally, the annual rate of return on capital (i.e., the dis-
count rate) is 10%.83
With these assumptions, I will calculate the present discounted
value of the net social benefits of the prospect system and of a stylized
nonprospect system in which no patent is granted until an invention is
fully developed. For each system, I will also calculate the year in
which patenting and commercialization will occur (which will, by defi-
nition, be the same year for the nonprospect system). The ultimate
goal of this analysis is to show how the problem of patent nondevelop-
ment might strengthen the case for a nonprospect system. To demon-
strate this, I will integrate a point suggested by Martin and Partnoy-
that the costs and benefits of patenting may be uncertain 84-directly
into the Duffy model. To provide a more complete analysis of the
threshold for patentability, however, I will first relax some other as-
sumptions in Duffy's model: first, that the public obtains no value
from a patent during the patent term besides what is captured by the
patentee; and second, that a patent race always produces a unique
winner.
1. Appropriability of Social Surplus
In the simplest version of his model, Duffy illustrates that a patent
prospect system can produce patenting, and thus entry into the public
domain, two years earlier than a nonprospect system could.85 His sim-
79 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 465-66. Duffy does not explicitly calculate the social
benefit of a prospect system versus that of a nonprospect system. While he notes that the
prospect system produces the social gain of inventions entering the public domain sooner,
see id. at 469, he does not note that this gain is partly offset by the innovation's being
introduced later in a prospect system than in a nonprospect system.
80 See id. at 465-66.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See supra Part I.A.1.
85 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 469.
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pie example illustrates a previously unrecognized consequence of
Barzel's point that the right to delay inventive efforts benefits the pat-
entee.8 6 If returns to the patentee increase social welfare, then it fol-
lows that the patentee's right to delay can also increase social welfare.
It might seem at first glance, however, that the right to delay would
cause a decrease in social welfare since it would delay the introduction
of the invention into the public domain. Barzel placed aside this ef-
fect-and the interest of the public besides the inventor-by assum-
ing that an inventor could appropriate the full social surplus of an
invention.8 7 He recognized, however, that relaxing this assumption
might mean that invention would occur too late, rather than too
early.88
Duffy's analysis is important because it shows that the right to de-
lay can benefit not only the inventor but also the public.89 By consid-
ering the effects of patent expiration, Duffy's model relaxes the
assumption in Barzel's model that the patentee captures all the social
surplus of the invention. Duffy continues to assume that "the paten-
tee captures all of the social benefits during the patent term."'9° How-
ever, this assumption is unrealistic because a patentee is unlikely to be
able to engage in perfect price discrimination or prevent all uncom-
pensated uses of the information in the patent. On relaxing this as-
sumption, it becomes clear that even if the prospect system causes
invention to occur earlier than it would in a nonprospect system, it
might also reduce social welfare by inefficiently delaying patent
development.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of allowing the portion of rents that
are appropriable to vary.9 1 The x-axis reports the proportion of the
patent's social benefits that the patentee, rather than the public, is
able to appropriate. The left y-axis reports the present discounted
value of the patent's total social benefits, including both those cap-
tured by the patentee and those captured by the public. The curves
beginning at the lower-left of the graph show this value in both a pros-
86 See Barzel, supra note 16, at 349.
87 See id. at 349-50; see also Duffy, supra note 25, at 440-41 (citing Barzel, supra note
16, at 352 n.l1) ("Barzel had suggested that . . . the social surplus associated with the
innovation [could be] preserved[ ] if the government assigned or auctioned off exclusive
claims to develop technological opportunities at a very early time-before any resources
were expended on developing the technology.").
88 See Barzel, supra note 16, at 354-55, 355 tbl.2.
89 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 469.
90 Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
91 The numbers used to derive the data in this and subsequent charts were obtained
from a computer program developed in C++. This program, which is available from the
author, calculates benefits and costs from the year 2000 to the year 2250 and discounts
those benefits and costs to the year 2000. Because the discount rate is higher than the rate
of growth, the effect of years beyond 2250 on the present discounted value of social welfare
in the year 2000 is trivial.
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pect system and a nonprospect system for each possible ap-
propriability proportion. The right y-axis represents years, and the
curves beginning at the upper-left show the year that patenting will
take place in prospect and nonprospect systems and the year that in-
vention will be completed in a prospect system. 92
FIGuRE 1. EFFECT OF VARYING APPROPRIABILITY ON SOCIAL BENEFIT
AND YEARS OF PATENTING AND INVENTION
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As Duffy's analysis suggests, 9 3 a prospect system leads to slightly
earlier patenting yet later invention than a nonprospect system, re-
gardless of the proportion of social benefit that the inventor can cap-
ture. When the inventor can appropriate all of the patent's social
benefits during the patent term, a prospect system produces greater
total discounted social benefits than a nonprospect system would, al-
though the difference is very small. At lower levels of appropriability,
however, a nonprospect system produces somewhat greater social ben-
efits than a prospect system. The delay between the acquisition of the
prospect patent and the date of invention is socially excessive because
the patentee does not fully internalize the social benefits of earlier
development of the invention. Thus, a prospect system might cause
excessive delay when the spillovers from patents are relatively high.94
92 Note, again, that in a prospect system, the inventor can delay completion of an
invention until after she obtains a patent, whereas in a nonprospect system, the inventor
must complete development of the invention in order to obtain a patent.
93 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 465-75.
94 For studies suggesting that there are considerable spillovers from patents as well as
from other research and development, see Timothy F. Bresnahan, Measuring the Spillovers
from Technical Advance: Mainframe Computers in Financial Services, 76 Am. ECON. REv. 742,
752-54 (1986), and Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial
Innovations, 91 Q.J. EcoN. 221, 233-35 (1977).
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2. Multiple Participants in the Race
This numerical example, of course, should not lead to a conclu-
sion that nonprospect systems dominate prospect systems in the real
world, since only slight changes in assumptions could reverse that con-
clusion.9 5 Most significantly, Duffy argues that a significant virtue of a
prospect system is that it reduces duplicative efforts to develop an in-
vention.96 In Figure 1, however, there is no duplication of efforts. In-
stead, the first inventor willing to bear the costs of the invention
simply spends the needed sums immediately and wins the race.
Figure 2 modifies this system by assuming that two firms are com-
peting for the patent and investing equal resources toward obtaining
the patent until, at the moment of patenting, the patent is issued to
one firm or the other. In this figure, the benefit of limiting duplica-
tion ensures that a prospect system comfortably dominates a nonpros-
pect system for the full range of appropriability values. A principal
reason for this is that, with the prospect approach, invention occurs
much earlier because the promise of reduction in duplicative effort
leads the firms to start racing earlier. Of course, this figure should
not lead one to conclude that a nonprospect system necessarily domi-
nates the prospect system either. With changes in some of Duffy's
other assumptions, the nonprospect system can once again catch up
to the prospect system. In particular, consider the possibility that the
award of a patent may not end a patent race.
Under Kitch's view of prospect theory, patents should be granted
early and broadly.97 While Duffy argued that patents need not be
broad, his model implicitly assumes that patents are sufficiently broad
to ensure that there is only one winner of the patent race.98 Yet pat-
ents using a variety of technologies might nevertheless target the same
consumer market. For example, although Prozac was the first selec-
tive serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) on the market, a number of
other SSRIs since its introduction have earned patents and market
share.99 Each drug might have distinct characteristics that make it
95 For example, it would be more realistic to assume that once the invention enters
the public domain, social benefits increase somewhat because deadweight loss no longer
exists. This seems likely to have only a slight effect in Figure 1, however, because the dates
of patenting in the prospect and nonprospect systems appear to be quite close.
96 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 469-75; see also id. at 443-44 (noting that this is not
necessarily counterbalanced by increased competition to obtain the patent prospect be-
cause earlier patenting can also dissipate rents).
97 See Kitch, supra note 13, at 267-70.
98 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 499-500.
99 See Which SSRI?, MED. LETTER ON DRUGS & THERAPEUTICS (The Med. Letter, Inc.,
New Rochelle, N.Y.), Nov. 24, 2003, at 93 (providing an overview of different SSRIs). Wil-
liam Landes and Richard Posner also use SSRIs to demonstrate that a patent race may have
multiple winners. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 301-02 (2003).
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better for a certain patient than is any other drug.10 0 To the extent
that "inventing around" produces patents with overlapping functional-
ity, however, the same inefficiency that might characterize patent
races can still exist. In effect, when different inventors pursue differ-
ent technological means to the same or a similar outcome, a patent
race can have multiple winners.
As Figure 3 shows, the existence of multiple winners of a patent
race largely eviscerates the benefits of a prospect system relative to a
nonprospect system. As in Figure 2, two firms are racing against one
another for patents, but in Figure 3 both firms obtain patents. Unsur-
prisingly, the dramatic benefits of the prospect system in reducing du-
plication disappear. In Figure 3, even though the patentees are
working on different technological means to the same end, they are
nonetheless effectively duplicating one another's efforts after receiv-
ing the patents. The prospect system thus differs from the nonpros-
pect system only in that the prospect system continues to allow
inventors to delay innovation, as in Figure 1. Once again, there is a
slight advantage for the prospect system with complete appropriability
of social surplus and a slight advantage for the nonprospect system
with incomplete appropriability of social surplus. Thus, granting pat-
ents early will improve welfare only to the extent that early patents
succeed in discouraging other players from engaging in further inven-
tive activity.
Figure 3 does not take into account that a patent system that re-
sults in multiple patents targeting the same consumer demand might
100 See Which SSRI?, supra note 99, at 93 ("Some patients who fail to respond to one
SSRI may respond to another, possibly because of differences in tolerability.").
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FIGURE 3. Two FIRMS COMPETING FOR Two PATENTS
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produce other benefits, such as reduced prices and a greater selection
of products available to consumers.'0 1 These considerations, however,
generally militate against a prospect system that gives broad control to
a patentee. After all, a patentee might not develop a product within
the scope of the original patent that would benefit some subset of
consumers relative to the original product. This holds true even if a
competitor would develop the product in a world in which the second
product was not covered by the first product's patent. The patentee,
unlike the competitor,'0 2 takes into account that some of the custom-
ers of the new product will be changing over from the old product. If
greater product development and variety benefit consumers, 1 3 then
broad prospect rights are likely undesirable. Thus, the possibility of
alternative technologies serving the same market demand further un-
dermines the case that a prospect system necessarily dominates a non-
prospect system.
101 These benefits partlyjustify a recent proposal for a nonexclusive patent system. See
John S. Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251 (2002)
(arguing for a patent system that would grant patents to more than one participant in the
patent race).
102 This failure of a market entrant to care that some of its business comes at the
expense of existing market participants is known in the industrial organization literature as
"demand diversion" or "business stealing." See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D.
Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RANDJ. ECON. 48, 49 (1986) (explaining how
this failure may lead to economically efficient entry).
103 Note that the economic literature on product differentiation suggests that it is pos-
sible to have too many or too few differentiated products in an imperfectly competitive
market. See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit &Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977).
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3. Uncertainty of Costs and Benefits of Patenting
The analysis so far might appear to indicate that the consequence
of the delay between the patent grant and the date of invention in a
prospect system is slight, at least relative to the consequence of dupli-
cative efforts. Delay, however, can have a pernicious effect that as-
sumptions underlying Figures 1 through 3 obscure: delay increases
the risk that a patentee will decide not to develop a patent. In the
analysis so far, patentees will never receive patents that they later re-
gret because the benefits and costs of developing a patent are entirely
predictable. In reality, however, this is not the case. After a patent is
issued, the patentee's estimate of the demand for the patented prod-
uct or process might change, as might the patentee's estimate of the
cost of development. If benefits turn out to be smaller or costs turn
out to be greater than anticipated, the patentee might decide not to
develop the patent within the patent term.
Figure 4 illustrates the result of a simulation model incorporating
such uncertainty. The simulation introduces a stochastic shock that
occurs immediately after the year in which a prospect patent would be
obtained. This shock changes the anticipated benefits by an amount
randomly selected from a uniform distribution of -25% to 25% and
also results, independently, in the anticipated costs changing by an
amount randomly selected from the same distribution. In a prospect
system, the decision whether and when to seek a patent depends on
these distributions. For each appropriability value (in 0.05 incre-
ments), the patent race begins in the first year in which the average
private benefit from racing is anticipated to be positive, based on 1000
simulations of the costs and benefits of patenting in different years
and taking into account the benefit of being able to delay invention
after the award of the patent. As Figure 4 demonstrates, even with this
relatively simple model and relatively small level of uncertainty, the
results are dramatic. 10 4 The nonprospect system now easily dominates
the prospect system. In a large percentage of cases,1 0 5 the prospect
patent is obtained so early that the invention is never developed, and
thus no social benefits result. This is so even though Figure 4 assumes
104 In Figure 3, the prospect invention year line reflects only those cases in which the
patent is in fact developed. In a more realistic model, almost every potential invention will
eventually be developed even if it is in the public domain. Such a model, however, would
only make the results here stronger by providing a longer average delay between invention
and development.
105 For example, when the appropfiability factor is 0.5, the invention is developed in
the prospect system only 5.4% of the time. Note again that in Figure 3, the prospect inven-
tion year refers to the average year of invention only in those cases in which the invention
is in fact developed. The development rate predictably increases with higher levels of ap-
propriability. Note that this simulation begins in 1980, not 2000, because uncertainty
made it profitable to acquire patents earlier. The prospect patent year line, which is cut off
inthe graph, descends to 1996 with appropriability equal to 1.0.
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that two firms are competing for the patent and that the patent race
will end as soon as one firm receives a patent.
FIGURE 4. UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF PATENTING
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Negative shocks are not the primary explanation for this dramatic
change. Rather, the possibility of positive shocks, which leads to ear-
lier patenting, increases the risk of patent nondevelopment. When
patenting is relatively inexpensive, it may be worthwhile to obtain a
patent even when the chances that the patent will be practical to de-
velop are very low. In these cases, inventors obtain patents for their
option value, and there is a substantial risk that they will not have
enough patent term in which to develop their inventions.
Nonetheless, Figure 4 should not be read as a criticism of our
patent system. Indeed, this analysis might support the existing patent
system for two reasons. First, the development of a patent will some-
times produce improvement patents, and an inventor will be willing to
invest in development if that investment will effectively extend the pat-
ent term. Figure 4 implausibly assumes that when there is insufficient
patent term tojustify development of the invention, the patentee will
never develop the invention. More realistically, first-mover advantages
will eventually make it profitable for someone-perhaps the original
patentee-to develop both the invention and a patentable improve-
ment in exchange for a patent on the improvement. 11 6 Of course, the
same risk of nondevelopment applies to improvement patents, so
these too might not be developed. Nonetheless, the danger of
nondevelopment strengthens the case for a patent system that allows
106 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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improvement patents. Thus, the analysis counters arguments that im-
provement patents inappropriately allow patentees to extend the lives
of their patents.10 7
Second, and more importantly, our patent system is not a pure
prospect system but actually lies somewhere between the prospect and
nonprospect approaches. For most inventions, it seems likely that the
patentee must spend more than 1% of the cost of the invention pro-
cess-the assumption in Duffy's numerical example-before the pat-
ent will issue. 10 8 The analysis in Figure 4 suggests only that an
extreme version of a prospect system might lower social welfare by
increasing nondevelopment. Increasing the hurdle for patentability
will increase the cost of the patent option and decrease the cost of
completing the commercialization process. Accordingly, requiring a
greater investment before a patent issues will lessen the danger that
inventors will patent so early that they will have an insufficient patent
term in which to develop the invention. Assuming that in our patent
system the process of invention generally costs considerably more
than 1% of the full costs of development, 10 9 our patent system might
strike a roughly appropriate balance between granting prospects too
early and granting them too late. While Kitch's and Duffy's argu-
ments in favor of a prospect system remain powerful, further analysis
107 Cf Thomas L. Irving & Michael D. Kaminski, Double Patenting: One Way, Two Way;
Whose Delay?, I U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 180, 185-87 (1993) (considering policy justifica-
tions in support of the doctrine preventing "double patenting" of the same invention as a
means of extending the patent term).
108 Further simulations performed by the present author (but not worth reporting in
detail here) reveal that if eligibility for a patent requires 10% of the cost of the invention
process, the development rate rises to about 82% if half of the social benefit is appropria-
ble, and with 50% of the cost of the invention process demanded, all inventions are devel-
oped. But this should not lead to complacency that nondevelopment is not a problem
because the assumed shock distribution, with an absolute value averaging 12.5%, is very
conservative. Many patented products will have substantial uncertainty about their cost of
completion and especially about their benefit since many developed products turn out to
be commercial disasters. With 50% of the cost of the invention process demanded in the
prospect system and an absolute average shock of 37.5%, only about 25% of inventions will
be developed; thus, a nonprospect system will produce greater social value. As these num-
bers suggest, confident assessments about the relative merits of prospect and nonprospect
systems require more empirical analysis of the information available to inventors. A more
complete model would also need to consider the effects of asymmetric information among
racers and the possibility that different racers may have information about the relative
success of other racers' efforts.
109 For an argument that the patent system does not in fact give as much control over
future development as Kitch claims because the patent statutes limit the patentee's monop-
oly to his claim and provide no basis for monopolizing future technology, see Roger L.
Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Competition, 5 REs. L. & ECON.
193, 194-95 (1983). The requirements for a patent, moreover, are nontrivial so it may be
unrealistic to assume that patents are granted when a patentee completes only a tiny frac-
tion of the work.
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of the nondevelopment problem suggests that these arguments can be
taken too far.
II
TowARD AN EMPIRICAiL ASSESSMENT
Patent underdevelopment is difficult to measure empirically.
Two questions illustrate this problem. First, how might patentees have
behaved differently if it were possible to obtain a longer patent term?
Second, would their different behavior have had positive or negative
consequences for social welfare? The first question is counterfactual,
and absent a natural experiment in which some patents randomly re-
ceive patent term extensions, little, if any, data exists from which to
extrapolate an answer. Measuring what is happening in the patent
system is difficult enough, 10 but trying to measure what might hap-
pen in a different patent system is virtually impossible absent experi-
mentation. Even if the additional number of patents that would be
commercialized given patent term extensions were available, analyz-
ing the impact on social welfare presents challenges. Although schol-
ars have developed methodologies for patent valuation, 1' calculating
social benefits will be more difficult still. 12
Despite difficulties in measuring these benefits, one can nonethe-
less progress in assessing the patent underdevelopment problem by
identifying particular situations in which underdevelopment or
nondevelopment might arise. The theoretical model of Part I sug-
gests that the patent system already partially responds to the danger by
establishing a relatively high threshold for patentability. Part II.A de-
velops a corollary: the problem of patent underdevelopment will be
greatest where patent protection is provided at an early stage. Except
to the extent countered by the legal system, patent underdevelopment
will be a danger in technological fields for which the patent system
most resembles a prospect system-those fields in which a great deal
of development must occur after patenting. Whether patent un-
derdevelopment occurs also depends on the degree of legal protec-
tion to which development activities will be entitled. Part II.B
110 For examples of works that seek to overcome these difficulties, see John R. Allison
et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 437 (2004), which analyzes results from a detailed
study of litigated patents to determine what makes a patent valuable, and James Bessen &
Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation 1-2 (Mar. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/econpaper25.pdf),
which analyzes the impact of patent protection on the software industry.
III See, e.g., Denton & Heald, supra note 30, at 1180, 1182 & n.26 (citing various meth-
odologies and proposing a new patent valuation method using the Black-Scholes equation
for stock options pricing).
112 See sources cited supra note 94 (seeking to measure spillovers from research
activity).
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identifies three types of development actiities-scientific experimen-
tation, market experimentation, and marketing-that produce infor-
mation that a patentee cannot protect with intellectual property
rights. Finally, Part II.C assesses whether the underdevelopment prob-
lem vanishes where the development activity consists of improving the
invention. Although improvements are generally patentable, some
may be unpatentable or not worth patenting. Moreover, inventors
may have socially suboptimal incentives late in the patent term to de-
velop even patentable improvements.
A. Embryonic Inventions
The existing patent system's standards for granting patents are
stringent.'1 3 An invention must be new and nonobvious, 1 t4 and al-
though many commentators criticize courts and the patent office for
frequently issuing patents for inventions that fail to meet these re-
quirements, 1 5 the language of the patent law presumes to weed out
inventions that are plainly anticipated in the prior art (or, at least, in
easily accessible prior art).11 6 Perhaps more importantly for the pur-
pose of this Article, a patentee must describe the invention so as to
enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to create it. 1 1 7 To
meet the doctrinal requirements, an inventor ordinarily will have to
think carefully about the invention and the "best mode" for practicing
it.' 18 Patentees will hesitate to undertake the costs of inventing and
patenting if it is likely that the options the patent provides will not be
worth exercising.
Nonetheless, the law gives inventors considerable leeway by not
requiring patentees to reduce their invention to practice so long as
they satisfy the enabling description requirement.1 19 As John Duffy
113 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000) (requiring the patentee to satisfy subject matter
requirements and standards of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness).
114 Id. § 103(a).
1 15 See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 32-34
(2004) (citing patents granted for a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, the process of toast-
ing bread, and a method of swinging on a swing).
116 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
117 See id. § 112. Some debate whether the written description and enablement re-
quirements are distinct or are one and the same. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman,J., dissenting) (noting a "burgeoning
conflict in pronouncements of this court" regarding § 112).
118 See 35 U.S.C. § 112; Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (setting forth a two-pronged test for compliance with the best mode require-
men t). See generally Kenneth R. Adamo, What's Better, What's Best - The Best Mode Requirement
in U.S. Patent Practice, 73J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'V 811 (1991) (discussing policies
behind the best mode requirement and how courts typically apply the doctrine).
119 See 35 U.S.C. § 112; W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) ("A patent is invalid only when those skilled in the art are required to engage in
undue experimentation to practice the invention."). As early as 1888, the Supreme Court
held that, to qualify for a patent, an inventor need only "describe[ ] his method with suffi-
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points out in a recent article, patent law tolerates embryonic inven-
tion.120 For example, "[nlo working models are required,"12' and in-
deed "[t]he inventor need not ever have built or tested the
invention." 122 Granting patents early may reduce wasteful duplication
and encourage earlier patent races, 123 but as this Article suggests,
prospect theory might also increase the risk of patent underdevelop-
ment. 124 To exercise the patent's development option, 125 the inven-
tor will eventually need to create a working model or build and test
the invention. The postpatenting cost of exercising the development
option will be greater if that cost includes these activities, and a paten-
tee facing a high postpatenting exercise price will be less likely to de-
velop the option. If, instead, these activities were prerequisites to
receiving a patent, then patenting might occur later. Once a patent
issues, the patentee might be more likely to further exercise the devel-
opment option.
In some fields, such as the pharmaceutical industry, the cost of
developing inventions is particularly high. Even Mark Lemley, who is
generally critical of Kitch's prospect theory and of the possibility that
awarding a patent might provide ex post as well as ex ante benefits, t26
has acknowledged that the pharmaceutical industry might be an ex-
ample in which the prospect theory is both descriptively accurate and
normatively justifiable. 27 The patent system could hypothetically is-
sue patents only after the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ap-
proves a manufacturer's drug based on that manufacturer's studies
establishing safety and effectiveness. But there would be obvious
problems with such a regime. For instance, pharmaceutical compa-
nies might be less willing to invest in the early stages of research if
they could not maintain their findings as trade secrets, since competi-
tors might specialize in testing promising substances found by others.
The existing approach, however, is also flawed. In particular, a phar-
maceutical company might receive a patent on a drug and then not
cient clearness and precision to enable those skilled in the matter to understand what the
process is, and . . . point[ ] out some practicable way of putting it into operation." The
Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 536 (1888).
120 See Duffy, supra note 32, at 6.
121 Id.; see In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that § 112
does not require the patentee to submit working models to obtain a patent).
122 Duffy, supra note 32, at 6.
123 See supra Part I.B.2.
124 See supra Part I.B.
125 See Martin & Portnoy Presentation, supra note 23.
126 See Lemley, supra note 75, at 131-32.
127 Id. at 141 ("Prospect theory is needed when control over subsequent development
is a necessary part of the incentive to produce the pioneering invention in the first place,
as is arguably true with pharmaceuticals.").
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develop that drug as much as it would if patent protection were
granted at a later stage of development.
Given the uniquely high cost of developing pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, it should not be surprising that Congress has responded with
remedies to the patent nondevelopment problem. For example, the
Orphan Drug Act provides seven years of exclusivity to a drug com-
pany that is willing to take the drug through the clinical testing and
governmental approval processes. 128 Congress thus recognized that,
even if a given medication existed, there might be insufficient incen-
tives for any company to conduct the scientific testing needed to es-
tablish the drug's safety. Although the Act focuses specifically on
drugs for diseases suffered by 200,000 or fewer individuals, 129 it also
protects manufacturers in cases where they do not reasonably expect
to recover their research costs through domestic sales. 130 The Act
even protects a drug that still has some patent term remaining, 3 1 thus
in effect allowing the pharmaceutical company to extend the patent
term.
The Hatch-Waxman Act' 3 2 provides additional remedies for the
patent underdevelopment problem. 13 3 That Act extends pharmaceu-
tical patent terms for half of the time needed to investigate the new
drug plus the time taken by the FDA to review the new drug applica-
tion.' 34 Congress thus recognizes that some inventions require
greater development time and costs. To that end, the statute extends
the patent term to reduce the risk that a patentee will not find exercis-
ing the development option worthwhile or, still worse, that a patentee
will not create such inventions in the first place. Interestingly, the
statute addresses the concern of patent underdevelopment with a
stick as well as a carrot. If a patentee is not diligent in developing an
invention over a period of time, the statute subtracts the period of
nondiligence from the sum of the terms used to calculate the patent
128 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97414,96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2000)). The seven-year exclusivity provision is found at
§ 360cc(a).
129 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a) (2) (A).
130 See id. § 360bb(a) (2) (B).
131 See Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, 99 Stat. 387 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360cc (2000)).
132 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
21, 28, & 35 U.S.C.).
133 For an overview of Hatch-Waxman and its legislative history, see Gerald J. Mos-
singhoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54
FooD & DRuG LJ. 187 (1999).
134 See 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2) (2000). The statute, however, allows for a maximum ex-
tension period of five years and no more than a fourteen-year period of market exclusivity.
See id. § 156(c) (3), (d)(5)(E).
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extension period.0 5  Thus, recognizing the problem of patent
nondevelopment is as important in explaining and justifying existing
features of the patent system as it is in suggesting reforms.
Within the pharmaceuticals area, the problem of patent un-
derdevelopment might be particularly acute in genomics. 13 6 Identify-
ing a genetic sequence is only the first step toward discovering a
particular therapeutic use for that sequence. One danger of granting
patents in gene sequences is that, by the time researchers see a thera-
peutic use on the horizon, the patent might have expired 3 7 or too
little patent term will remain to make research financially worthwhile.
Nonetheless, property rights in genetic sequences might reduce the
risk of duplicative research and assure potential researchers that
others will not free ride off of their efforts. The Patent and Trade-
mark Office's (PTO) Utility Guidelines solve this problem in part by
requiring that applications for gene sequences demonstrate a specific
and substantial utility,'38 but broader property rights coupled with a
longer patent term might further increase development incentives.
Industry-specific responses such as the Orphan Drug Act, the
Hatch-Waxman Act, and the Utility Guidelines help limit the danger
of patent underdevelopment, and the theory developed in this Article
justifies including such legal regimes as supplements to the patent sys-
tem within our system of innovation. Nonetheless, such protection
cannot provide confidence that the patent system has entirely con-
quered the danger of patent underdevelopment. For example, these
responses might be inadequate to foster an optimal amount of re-
search and development in genomics, and there is no guarantee that
the additional periods of exclusivity from the Orphan Drug Act and
the Hatch-Waxman Act are long enough to prevent underdevelop-
ment of nongenomic drugs. Moreover, patentees might develop
135 See id. § 156(c) (1).
136 For a general discussion of the science of genomics and recent developments in
the field, see Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Relections on the Science and Law of
Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REv. 871, 880-83 (2006).
137 Cf id. at 884-85 (noting that "lead optimization," just one stage in the drug devel-
opment process, can take "several years" to finish and costs between two and four million
dollars). The genomics revolution also presents a related problem: once it becomes feasi-
ble to test many people for individual genetic variations, researchers will need to test many
existing treatments to determine which groups of the population can benefit from those
treatments. But, without protection for the underlying treatments, there will be little in-
centive to engage in such testing. See Arti K. Rai, Pharmacogenetic Interventions, Orphan
Drugs, and Distributive Justice: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 19 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 246,
249-51 (2002).
138 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). The
concern animating the Guidelines was not the problem of patent nondevelopment, but
simply the concern that patents were being granted without sufficient inventive accom-
plishment. See generally Lawrence T. Kass & Michael N. Nitabach, A Roadmapfor Biotechnol-
ogy Patents? Federal Circuit Precedent and the PTO's New Examination Guidelines, 30 AIPLA Q.J.
233, 248-65 (2002) (providing an overview of the Guidelines).
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many inventions in other technological fields if more patent term re-
mained. The importance of "prophetic" 139 claims over anticipated re-
search results in the biotechnology sector 140  and in other
technological areas' 41 signals the necessity of continued development
after the patent is issued. The next section identifies the specific types
of development that patentees might not perform without extended
periods of exclusivity.
B. Nonpatentable Development
One possible solution to the patent underdevelopment problem
is for the patent system to reward development activity with a patent
term extension. Part II.A noted that the Hatch-Waxman Act adopts a
version of this approach, 142 and Part III will consider the possibility of
a systematic approach to patent term extensions. The patent system,
however, already has a built-in mechanism for providing additional
patent term for development activities: the system of improvement
patents. If a party improves on a patented invention and the improve-
ment meets the criteria for patentability, the party can obtain an im-
provement patent. 143 When the recipient of an improvement patent
is a third party, both the original inventor and the third party own
"blocking" rights, which prevent the other from practicing the im-
proved technology during the term of the relevant patents. 144 When
the original inventor receives an improvement patent, there is no
blocking and the original inventor receives a fresh patent term. The
patent system, however, still permits third parties to practice the origi-
nal invention after the end of the original term.
By rewarding parties with exclusivity when they improve the origi-
nal invention, the patent system encourages parties to engage in de-
139 Under patent-claiming rules, "[s]imulated or predicted test results and prophetical
examples . . . are permitted in patent applications." U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01 (p), at 600-99
(8th ed., 5th rev. 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep
e8r5_- 0600.pdf.
140 See, e.g., Harold C. Wegner & Stephen B. Maebius, The Global Biotech Patent Applica-
tion, in BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW: BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS & BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 87, 96-97 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-666, 2001)
(discussing the tradition of prophetic claiming of biotech patents).
141 See, e.g., Energy Absorption Sys., Inc. v. Roadway Safety Servs., Inc., No. 96-1264,
1997 WL 368379, at *5 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 1997) (discussing the prophetic examples doctrine
in the context of a mechanical invention).
142 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
143 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
144 See Lemley, supra note 9, at 1010 ("The original patent owner can prevent the im-
prover from using his patented technology, but the improver can also prevent the original
patent owner from using the improvement. Unless the parties bargain, no one gets the
benefit of the improvement."). See generally Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents,
Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 168 (2004) (explaining the phenomenon of blocking patents).
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velopment activity that the finite patent term might otherwise
discourage. Nonetheless, improvement patents are not a complete so-
lution to the patent underdevelopment problem because some forms
of patent development do not entitle the original patent holders to
new patents. 45 And, if third parties can free ride on these same devel-
opment activities after the patent term, patentees might have insuffi-
cient incentives to undertake them during the patent term. These
development activities include performing studies to assess the effec-
tiveness of the invention, testing commercially the public's demand
for the invention, and informing consumers or others about the
invention.
1. Scientific Testing
The most obvious, though perhaps not the most commercially
significant, form of unpatentable development activity is scientific test-
ing. 146 As evidenced by statutes such as the Orphan Drug Act, the
need to encourage scientific testing of inventions is particularly acute
for pharmaceuticals. 47 However, a wide range of inventions might
benefit from further testing to determine how well the invention will
perform in the marketplace. If tests reveal that an invention will not
perform well, the results will help the patentee make an informed de-
cision about whether to fully commercialize it. In addition, the less
patent term remaining, the more incentive patentees have to commer-
cialize products without testing them and thus without finding solu-
tions to potential problems.
Yet, the patent system cannot adapt by merely granting improve-
ment patents on scientific testing because it is generally impossible to
distinguish the scientifically tested invention from the original.
Therefore, if the patent system granted a patent holder a new patent
for the mere act of engaging in scientific testing, it would essentially
provide a mechanism through which all patent holders could extend
their patent terms ad infinitum, unless patent offices applied a subjec-
tive test that asked whether such testing is sufficiently important to
justify a patent term extension.
145 An additional reason is that improvement patents may provide suboptimal incen-
tives even for patentable development activities. See infra Part II.C.
146 Edmund Kitch recognized how important it is for patentees to engage in scientific
testing of their inventions but assumed that the underlying patent would provide them
with sufficient incentives to do so. See Kitch, supra note 13, at 277 ("Absent a patent, firms
have less than the optimal incentive to invest in providing information about and tech-
niques for using the new technology."). But, because patents only protect an invention for
a finite period, they too provide less than optimal incentives for patentees to invest in
scientific testing.
147 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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If the scientific research points to a new use for the original in-
vention, however, the patentee may be able to obtain an improvement
patent since the current patent system permits parties to obtain pat-
ents on new uses for existing inventions.' 48 For example, a use patent
might cover the use of a previously invented drug for a new medical
condition.' 49 However, such improvement patents may be difficult to
obtain because the "new" use may have been obvious, even if it was
not obvious that the new use would be effective. 50 In addition, a use
patent might be difficult to enforce because the patentee may be una-
ble to determine whether consumers are using the invention for its
original purpose, as opposed to its new purpose, and for which pur-
pose sellers are encouraging consumers to use the invention. 151
Unsurprisingly, courts have been skeptical of efforts to obtain
broad patent protection for scientific studies. For example, the Fed-
eral Circuit recently upheld a district court's invalidation of a patent
for growing and eating cruciferous sprouts, such as broccoli, to reduce
the level of carcinogenic substances and the risk of cancer.1 52 The
patentee argued that it had discovered a new method for "selecting
the particular seeds that will germinate as sprouts rich in glucosino-
lates."'153 The court, however, held that, "[w]hile [the patentee] may
have recognized something about sprouts that was not known before,
[the patentee's] claims do not describe a new method."1 54 With its
claim rejected, the patentee had no access to additional patent protec-
tion. As a result of the Federal Circuit's decision, patentees may not
have the incentive to research known but unproven scientific hypothe-
ses about public domain products, such as cruciferous sprouts, or
even about their own products. Given the difficulty that courts would
face in determining the extent to which a particular experiment re-
duced scientific uncertainty, the Federal Circuit's decision is likely a
good one, but its effect may require the patent system to provide par-
ties with nonpatent innovation incentives, such as governmental scien-
tific grants, to encourage research on patented or once-patented
inventions.
148 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
149 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHIcs 717, 720 (2005).
15o See, e.g., Allegheny Drop Forge Co. v. Portec, Inc., 541 F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1976)
("A new use for an old process or product is patentable if the new use or application is
itself not 'obvious' to one skilled in the art.").
151 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 149, at 720 ("The discovery of a new use for an old
drug might support a patent on a method of treatment, but such a patent offers little
effective protection against generic competition once the drug itself is off-patent and may
lawfully be sold for an older, unpatented use.").
152 See In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
153 Id. at 1351.
154 Id. at 1352.
[Vol. 92:10651100
UNDERDEVELOPED PATENT PROSPECTS
While it is difficult to determine whether a particular decision not
to engage in testing is attributable to the limited amount of patent
term remaining, anecdotal evidence suggests that drug manufacturers
are less willing to conduct trials near patent expiration. For example,
a New York Times editorial noted that when NitroMed conducted full
testing of its heart failure drug, BiDil, it did so only in a population of
African-American patients when " [s] ome experts believe [d] that.., it
would have been possible to devise a better study to test the drug in a
broad population, notjust a single racial group." 155 But, with the pat-
ent on the underlying drug expiring in 2007,156 NitroMed had insuffi-
cient incentives to conduct tests on the general population and
targeted only a narrow group, recognizing that it could obtain a use
patent for using the drug to benefit the targeted group. If enough
patent term remained on the underlying drug, NitroMed might have
had an incentive to test the drug on a broader population. While Ni-
troMed did engage in some testing of the drug, other patentees might
forego any testing in such a situation.
2. Commercial Experimentation
Patents generally encourage commercial experimentation, but as
with scientific testing, this encouragement may be suboptimal due to
the limited patent term. Some inventions might be so significant that
they are obviously worth commercializing. In far more cases, it will be
obvious by the end of the patent term that the underlying invention is
not worth commercializing. But some inventions might have an un-
certain probability of commercial success. Patent protection provides
incentives for inventors to experiment commercially with their pat-
ented products, because without such protection, third parties might
be able to free ride off the information gleaned from the inventor's
commercial experiments. 57 Consequently, the more the patent sys-
tem limits a patent term, the less incentive a patentee has to engage in
beneficial commercial experiments.
The problem of inventors' not engaging in sufficient commercial
experimentation is particularly severe for inventions that have a small
probability of large commercial success and a great probability of fail-
ure. Once an invention falls into the public domain, someone consid-
ering commercializing the invention faces the prospect of bearing the
entire cost of the experimentation if it fails. If it succeeds, the original
155 See Editorial, The First Race-Based Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, § 4, at 11.
156 See id. NitroMed received an improvement patent for using the drug on African-
American patients. See U.S. Patent No. 6,784,177 (filed Aug. 2, 2002) (issued Aug. 31,
2004).
157 See Kieff, supra note 19, at 708-09 (noting the advantage enjoyed by a second-
mover since "mere knowledge of a first mover's success eliminates a great deal of risk from
the second mover's decision whether to embark on the same enterprise").
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experimenter is likely to enjoy a larger market share than subsequent
entrants due to trademark protection. 158 But third parties will soon
enter the market and claim some portion of the market share that the
initial commercial experimenter would enjoy in a regime of perpetual
patent protection. Because of other costs of perpetual protection, the
current patent system only protects patents for a limited time; as a
result, inventors will forego at least some experiments that they other-
wise would have undertaken.
Given the considerable gap that often exists between the dates of
invention and initial commercial experimentation, 159 the finite patent
term might discourage many commercial experiments. That does not
mean, however, that the inventor or some third party will never put
the underlying inventions through commercial testing. Eventually, as
the potential market for an invention grows and its production costs
fall, some entrepreneur might find it worthwhile to perform the com-
mercial test and enjoy whatever advantages lead time and trademark
law provide. But the finite patent term might still considerably delay
commercialization. Empirical calculation of the length of such delays
may be impossible. Nevertheless, one can speculate that since com-
mercial experimentation occurs in all technological areas, the ab-
sence of sufficient incentives for commercial experimentation is an
even more serious problem than the absence of sufficient incentives
for scientific experimentation.
3. Marketing and Advertising
Even a patentee who has fully scientifically tested an invention
and has decided to commercialize it must still decide how much to
market and advertise it. Some commentators argue that advertising
can be economically efficient because it provides information to con-
sumers and may result in lower prices. 160 The less patent term re-
maining, however, the less advertising patentees will engage in since
third parties can enter the market and free ride off of their advertising
investment. This conclusion has empirical support. Studies suggest,
for example, that pharmaceutical companies sharply cut back on mar-
158 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellec-
tual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1473-74 (2002). Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegel-
man have argued that "leveraging" a patent through a trademark is socially optimal
because it increases a patentee's incentive to invent without increasing deadweight loss. See
id. at 1473-86.
159 See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 13, at 272 thl.1.
160 See Timothy J. Muris, California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission: The
Revenge of Footnote 17, 8 Sup. CT. EcoN. REv. 265, 293-97 (2000) (surveying reports on the
effects of advertising on the cost and quality of products).
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keting expenses shortly before a patent falls into the public
domain. 1 61
The more difficult empirical question is the extent to which ad-
vertising, on a general level, is socially suboptimal. Some economists
suggest that advertising may lead to societal inefficiency by inducing
consumers to purchase products that they do not need.'6 2 To the ex-
tent this is so, the finite patent term raises rather than lowers social
welfare by decreasing advertising. When the patent term ends, third
parties will enter the market and introduce competition. This compe-
tition will lead to additional advertising, which may increase ineffi-
ciency as advertisers seek to induce customers to purchase their
product over another party's product, even though there are no real
quality differences among them.' 63 Any complete empirical analysis is
likely to produce different conclusions for different inventions, but in
at least some situations, the finiteness of the patent term might lead to
advertising that provides less useful information to consumers.
C. Patentable Improvements
Thus far, the analysis has focused on development activities that
produce information upon which a third party can free ride. To the
extent that a development activity results not only in information but
also in a new patentable invention, an improvement patent can pro-
vide renewed protection and reduce the danger of patent un-
derdevelopment. 164 Nevertheless, the availability of improvement
patents does not ensure optimal incentives to engage in research
aimed at improving inventions.
First, consider incentives during the original patent term. Sup-
pose, for example, that a potential inventor anticipates that research
will lead to improvements that, if incorporated into the patentee's
product, could lead to an additional $1 million profit during the origi-
nal patent term. If the patentee is the potential inventor, then the
patentee will be able to retain all of the additional profits that result
from improvements during the patent term. Patenting the improve-
ment might, as always, produce spillovers in the form of information
161 See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt et al., The Long Shadow of Patent Expiration: Generic Entry and
RX to OTC Switches, in SCANNER DATA AND PRICE INDEXES 229, 261 (Robert C. Feenstra &
Matthew D. Shapiro eds., 2003), available at http://faculty.london.edu/mkyle/Rx%20to%
200TC%20paper.pdf (reporting that pharmaceutical companies decrease their spending
on drug advertising in the years before the patent expires).
162 See, e.g., Nicholas Kaldor, The Economic Aspects of Advertising, 18 REv. ECON. STUD. 1,
5-6 (1950-51).
163 See id.; see also Avinash Dixit & Victor Norman, Advertising and Welfare: Another Reply,
11 BELLJ. ECON. 753, 753 (1980) (suggesting the possibility of socially inefficient competi-
tive advertising).
164 See supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
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or consumer surplus. 65 Even placing aside these spillover concerns,
third parties may have suboptimal incentives to create improvements.
Because the patentee and the improver can each block the other from
practicing the improved invention during the patent term,16 6 the par-
ties will have to negotiate an agreement, meaning that the surplus
from the improvement must be shared between the improver and the
original patentee. Sometimes, a patentee might precommit to giving
away a relatively large portion of this surplus to improvers in order to
generate more improvements, but this may be difficult to accomplish
and may not result in the intended benefit. 167 Thus, at least during
the remainder of the patent term, the incentives of a third-party im-
prover to engage in research and development may be suboptimal.
The economics of improvements become even more complicated
when we consider the years following the conclusion of the original
patent term. The major problem in this context is that different im-
provements may be substitutes for one another. To take an extreme
example, suppose that there are two mutually incompatible improve-
ments to an invention, and either improvement would allow the pat-
entee of that improvement to earn an additional $1 million in profit.
If both improvements are created, however, each might be worth only
$500,000, or even less, as a result of price competition between the
rival improvers. Ironically, the possibility of a second improver may
mean in some circumstances that no one will improve at all or that
improvements will come later. The danger of inadequate incentives
to improve will be especially acute if the first improvement produces
valuable information about the size of the market.168
The recent developments in the prospect theory of patent law
discussed above provide a framework for understanding this con-
cern. 69 Because patent protection provides considerable control
over the development of improvements, a patentee need not worry
too much about competition from rival improvers, 170 or at all about
165 See supra note 94.
166 See Mireles, supra note 144, at 168. Obviously, the original patentee can practice
the original invention but cannot practice the improvement. See id. The improver can
practice neither the original invention nor the improvement without a license from the
original patentee. See id.
167 See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Essay, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89
VA. L. RFv. 1857, 1860 (2003) (suggesting that patentees do this by publishing without
patenting aspects of their inventions).
168 Suppose there is a 50% chance that there will be no market for the improved prod-
uct and a 50% chance that consumers will be willing to spend enough extra for the im-
proved product to produce an additional $2 million for a single improver. If the
underlying invention remained under patent protection, then the patentee would be will-
ing to invest up to $1 million in the improvement.
169 See supra Parts I.A.2, I.B (discussing Duffy's model).
170 See Duffy, supra note 25, at 489-90 (arguing that the patentee has an advantage,
though only a limited one, over competitors in the search for improvements). If, however,
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the prospect of rivals making substitutes to the patentee's own im-
provements, since the patentee can block such improvements during
the patent term.' 7' Because this protection assures patentees that
they will be able to reap the benefits of their research and develop-
ment on improvements, it could lead to earlier and greater invest-
ment. Once the patent falls into the public domain, however, these
benefits are lost. Thus, when only a relatively short portion of a pat-
ent term remains, incentives to make improvements might be subop-
timal. Because of the possibility that patentees will lose a hypothetical
patent race to improve a patent nearing expiration, both the patentee
and third parties might not find it worthwhile to enter the race at all.
To be sure, the possibility of improvement patents results in consider-
ably better incentives to engage in development activities that might
produce such patents, but aggregate investment in such activities
might still be lower than if a longer patent term remained.
In addition, improvement patents do not encourage develop-
ment activities that might produce improvements but that will not
subsequently receive patent protection. One reason improvements
might not be patented is that they do not themselves meet the stan-
dards of patentability. For example, the Patent and Trademark Office
could conclude that a particular improvement would have been obvi-
ous to a person having ordinary skill in the art,172 even though such a
person will obviously not work for free. Even some valuable and inno-
vative improvements might not obtain patent protection, 73 though
the PTO's relatively relaxed standards suggest that this problem is not
terribly severe. 174 Moreover, even if all improvements are potentially
patentable under current patent administration practices, some im-
provements might be too small to justify the expense of patent prose-
cution.1 75 These concerns might be of relatively little economic
significance, but they further justify the concern that nearing the end
of patent protection might lead to a decrease in development
expenditures.
assuring patentees that they will be able to win the race for improvement will lead to earlier
searches for such improvements, Duffy's analysis arguably provides a basis for granting
patentees a stronger property right.
171 See Mireles, supra note 144, at 168.
172 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
173 See Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable
Goods, 81 MINN. L. REv. 693, 712-14 (1997) (discussing the possibility that some significant
inventions will be ineligible for patent protection).
174 See generally JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 115 (documenting the problem of overly
relaxed standards and suggesting potential reforms).
175 See supra note 31 (discussing the cost of patent prosecution).
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III
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The discussion so far suggests that patent law presents a central
tradeoff-a postpatenting version of the classic tradeoff between pro-
viding incentives to invent and ensuring access to inventions. If a pat-
ent term is too short, the patentee might have socially insufficient
incentives to develop the patent by engaging in nonpatentable re-
search and commercialization activities, but if it is too long, excessive
deadweight loss will result. Unfortunately this tradeoff cannot simply
be optimized even in theory by setting the patent term to an appropri-
ate length, since if a patent race amounts to an implicit patent auc-
tion, 176 longer nominal patent terms will push inventive activity earlier
and result in shorter effective patent terms.
An alternative approach might be to allow patentees some power
to delay the issuance of their patents. Indeed, the practice of continu-
ing applications combined with the old system that measured patent
life from the time of issuance, 177 as opposed to the time of filing, 178
effectively accomplished this result. The serious drawbacks to this sys-
tem included the creation of "submarine patents" that enabled paten-
tees to defeat other inventors' reasonable expectations by
intentionally delaying patent prosecution, only to later allow the pat-
ent to "surface unexpectedly and take competitors by surprise."'179 In
theory, the patent system could provide a formal mechanism for al-
lowing delayed initial effectiveness of a patent while still ensuring im-
mediate issuance. An inventor would then be able to delay patent
issuance until the patent is most valuable. While this type of system
would provide the benefit of encouraging the invention of fundamen-
tal building-block technologies long before they become commer-
cially useful, it would also have serious drawbacks. In some cases, a
delay would amount to no more than an extension of the patent mo-
nopoly because other firms would be unwilling to use a technology
that they knew would later fall under patent protection. In other
cases, firms might not delay at all, despite the danger of patent un-
derdevelopment, in order to gain the benefits to reputation of being
the first to market.
As a practical matter, the patent system accommodates the patent
underdevelopment concern with a separate policy lever, namely the
176 See supra Part I.A.2.
177 Prior to 1995, the patent term was seventeen years from the date of issuance. See
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4984
(1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000)); see also Mark A. Lemley &
Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. Rv. 63, 80 (2004).
178 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2).
179 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 177, at 79-80.
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designation of the quantum of achievement required for a patent to
issue.180 While requiring more achievement up front reduces the risk
of patent underdevelopiient, it also increases inefficient duplication
and is, in the end, a crude policy response. This system exercises the
policy lever at the beginning of the patent term when the risk of un-
derdevelopment is least clear. Thus, even if the patent system sought
to account explicitly for the risk of nondevelopment, doing so prema-
turely would frustrate that already difficult endeavor. This leaves two
possible sets of strategies for penalizing underdevelopment: one in-
volving a stick and the other a carrot.
The stick approach would impose an affirmative requirement
that the patentee proceed with development. Europe utilizes such an
affirmative requirement by demanding compulsory licensing in the
absence of development. 18 A more drastic affirmative requirement,
which Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky came close to endors-
ing in a recent article, 8 2 would require that such patents be placed in
the public domain. These stick approaches run into serious
problems, however. Presumably, mere token development expenses
would not count, but that means courts would need to engage in diffi-
cult line-drawing problems to determine how much development
should count as enough. More worrisome is the likelihood that such
legal requirements would encourage patentees to engage in wasteful
pseudodevelopment simply to preserve the value of their development
options. An even more fundamental problem with the stick approach
is that the remedy may be worse than the disease. Once the patent is
in the public domain, no one will have an incentive to develop it,18 3
and presumably no one who could benefit from a compulsory license
will want to develop a product that the initial patentee, who unlike the
licensee did not have to pay a license fee, did not think would be
profitable.
180 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
181 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
182 See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Essay, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 395 (2005). The authors argue that those who conceive of ideas that need develop-
ment should get intellectual property protection but then be required to auction their
ideas to potential idea developers. See id. at 399-402. If the high bidder in the develop-
ment stage fails "to produce a patent or product within a given time period, say two years,"
id. at 421, then the idea would be placed in the public domain, id. at 418-19. Because this
idea regime is virtually identical to the existing patent regime, see id. at 426-27 (imposing
traditional requirements for patentability along with a requirement of "developability"),
the proposal is effectively close to one that would combine mandatory auctions with a
development requirement. To the extent that nondevelopment is a significant concern for
their proposal, a better approach might be to penalize a nondeveloper by reauctioning the
intellectual property right and by making auction revenues payable to the government.
183 See supra pp. 1069-70. Thus, a development mandate will only achieve its goal if
placing the idea in the public domain successfully deters nondevelopment and did not
often actually need to occur.
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Though the infeasibility of the stick approach suggests that a car-
rot might be needed, it would be difficult to develop a suitable carrot
within the patent term. While the government can provide research
subsidies, efficiently targeting those subsidies to situations in which
nondevelopment is a particular danger would be difficult. Instead, a
carrot is probably best offered near the end of the patent term when
the additional development activities an extended patent term would
enable and the costs of extended protection should be clear. There
may be instances, for example, in which it is clear that a product sim-
ply will not be developed in the absence of a patent extension, even if
the patent is placed in the public domain, and thus, the public would
be better off with a patent extension than without it.
A relatively naive way to implement the carrot would be for Con-
gress or an administrative agency to grant patent extensions. In the
early nineteenth century, Congress occasionally granted patent term
extensions in individual cases. 184 In the 1980s, Congress enacted a
few specific extensions to compensate patentees for time lost to
premarket review by the FDA,185 and in 1984, Congress enacted a sys-
tematic patent extension program for inventions that required FDA
premarket review. 186 Pharmaceuticals might well be a category of in-
vention in which the risk of nondevelopment is particularly high be-
cause of the expensive and nonpatentable commercialization activities
that patentees must undertake. 187 However, Congress acted primarily
based on fairness concerns rather than on concrete concerns about
patent nondevelopment. 188 The predictable result of any case-by-case
patent extension grant is rent seeking, and the patents most likely to
justify lobbying expense-and thus to receive extensions-are likely
those that have already shown strong commercial success, not necessa-
rily those that need additional time. Of course, anticipating the possi-
bility of an extension might stimulate additional development effort.
But an ad hoc case-by-case extension system provides little guarantee
that extensions will be anything but windfalls. In short, the carrot
should not be too sweet.
Patent extension auctions present a straightforward means of pro-
viding patent extensions without the inadvertent side effect of creat-
ing windfalls. In a simple patent extension auction regime, the right
184 For a history of nineteenth-century private patent extension bills, see Richard M.
Cooper, Legislative Patent Extensions, 48 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 59, 59-62 (1993).
185 See id. at 62-73.
186 This program is known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restora-
tion (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, & 35 U.S.C.). See Cooper, supra note 184, at 62-73; supra
notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
187 See supra Part II.A.
188 See Mossinghoff, supra note 133, at 188.
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to a patent extension term would be auctioned to the highest bidder,
which might not be the original patentee. The same approach can be
used for copyrights. William Landes and Richard Posner have sug-
gested that indefinite copyright terms might be optimal, 8 9 but this
argument by itself does notjustify providing certain copyright holders
with the windfall of copyright extensions. As John Duffy has noted, if
the benefits of extending existing copyright terms exceed the costs of
deadweight loss, auctioning the copyright rather than granting the ex-
tension automatically to the copyright holder might still accomplish
this result.190 A straightforward second-price sealed bid auction' 9' al-
lows the holder of an intellectual property right to receive an exten-
sion, but only by paying the government what the right would be
worth to the next highest bidder. If the original right holder wins the
auction, the right holder will still receive a small award equal to the
difference between its valuation and the second-highest valuation.
The expectation of such small payments would slightly strengthen the
reward function of the intellectual property system and thus increase
incentives to invest in future inventions and copyrights. Thus, in the
long run, these small windfalls would not be transfer payments but
would instead be part of the incentive to create.
That patent extension auctions can largely eliminate windfalls
while reducing the risk of patent nondevelopment does not mean that
they are optimal. Since extending a patent term, like extending a
copyright term, will impose a deadweight loss, an auction should oc-
cur only when the social benefit of reducing the risk of nondevelop-
ment exceeds the costs. These costs include not only deadweight loss
but also the administrative costs of the auction and the research costs
of bidders. Parts III.A and III.B consider the government and the pat-
ent holder as alternative decision makers of whether patent extension
auctions should occur. Although this Article argues that both ap-
proaches might increase welfare, giving the patent holder incentives
to make a socially optimal decision is the more intriguing choice. Be-
cause patent law applies in largely the same way across all technology
189 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable. Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003).
190 SeeJohn F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1077, 1094 (2005) ("In a world where ... government-conferred property rights are
increasingly auctioned rather than gifted," laws providing intellectual property extensions
"look more anomalous, and there is a general and principled theory for resisting
them .... ").
I) In a second-price sealed bid auction, the winner pays the amount of the second-
highest bid; this gives each bidder an incentive to bid the bidder's actual valuation. See
William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8,
20-23 (1961) (introducing this auction form and discussing its benefits).
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classes and all inventions, 92 variables such as the patent term necessa-
rily reflect crude attempts at balancing costs and benefits. 93 Al-
though the government might seek to tailor patents to the
characteristics of particular inventions,1 94 that task, if feasible, is more
likely to be accomplished by harnessing the information of private
parties.
A. Government-Decreed Patent Extension Auctions
Consider first a regime in which the government could decide
case-by-case whether to auction a patent extension. Conceivably, such
an auction might take place just when a patent was about to fall into
the public domain. The auction would thereby ensure additional
years in which development activities could occur. However, the pat-
entee would still have little incentive to engage in nonpatentable de-
velopment activities in the final years of the patent term. For
example, a marketing campaign to inform consumers of the benefits
of a patented product might be useful primarily to ensure robust sales
after the patent is set to expire. 195 Even if the patentee anticipates
that a patent extension will be auctioned at the end of the patent
term, the patentee will be unable to harness these marketing benefits
since the patent extension will be worth more to all bidders. In effect,
the marketing campaign would increase the amount that the patentee
would have to pay at auction to receive the patent.
More specifically, assume there is a cash auction with payment
due to the government 96 and a marketing campaign that would cost
$500,000 and would increase the value of the patent during the exten-
sion period by a present discounted value of $1,000,000. The cam-
paign then would not be worthwhile. The patentee would have to pay
the $1,000,000 in the form of a higher bid. If the marketing cam-
paign did not affect pre-expiration sales, even anticipating victory in
the auction, the campaign would end up costing $1,500,000 for
192 But cf Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1183-85 (2002) (arguing that although the rules of patent law are the
same across technology areas, in practice their application varies by industry).
193 See Duffy, supra note 58, at I ("The problem of fixing an optimal patent term ... is
generally viewed as achieving a balance between the incentives necessary to encourage
innovation and the inefficiencies associated with the exclusive right.").
194 For an analysis of the possible benefits and costs of individualized tailoring of intel-
lectual property protection, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the
Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, II Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 1, 39-48 (2004). For an article
suggesting the possibility of nonuniform patent terms with patentees selecting their own
patent terms based on a fee schedule, see Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent
Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND J. ECoN. 197, 197-98 (1999).
195 See supra Part II.B.3.
196 Payment ought to be to the government rather than to the patentee. Otherwise,
the patent extension auction is simply a patent extension program in disguise, and the
patentee would always be able to keep the patent by entering a very high bid.
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$1,000,000 in benefit. Of course, a patent extension auction immedi-
ately following patent expiration does not mean that nonpatentable
development activities will cease altogether. If the extension is for a
sufficiently long period, the winner of the auction, whether the origi-
nal patentee or a third party, will have an incentive to launch the mar-
keting campaign. The campaign, however, will have been inefficiently
delayed until the expiration of the original patent term.
Alternatively, the government could hold an auction five years
before the end of the patent term for the patent right in a period
immediately following the patent term. Under this approach, if the
patentee won the extension, the patentee would have an incentive to
continue development activity in the closing years of the patent term.
Even if a third party won the extension, the patentee and the auction
winner could negotiate agreements to ensure continued develop-
ment, since the auction winner could pay some of the development
costs.
It is challenging to determine the optimal time to hold the auc-
tion. The earlier the patent extension auction occurs, the weaker the
available information about the necessity of the extension will be.
Holding the auction at the beginning of the patent term would pro-
vide the strongest assurance against patent nondevelopment-at least
assuming the patentee wins the extension-but the least certainty
about whether the benefits of the auction are worth the additional
deadweight loss.
The central question for government-decreed patent extension
auctions is whether the government, either acting through Congress
or through an administrative agency, will do a good job determining
whether and when to hold the auctions. False negatives-inefficient
decisions not to hold auctions-at least leave the patent system no
worse than the status quo, but false positives-inefficient decisions to
hold auctions-could mean unjustified increases in deadweight
lOSS. 19 7 The attraction of auction revenue might lead the government
to hold auctions that amount to inefficient taxes. Of course, this is
nothing new, since the government must always make decisions about
how to raise revenue. But even if a particular auction is inefficient, it
might be less so than the alternative means of raising the same reve-
nue. Auctioning monopoly rights to fields that could be competitive
is likely an inefficient approach to revenue generation, 198 but if hold-
ing such auctions allows patentees to internalize the benefits of their
197 See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 158, at 1462.
198 See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 200-05
(2003) (arguing that the monopoly distortion from patents is generally greater than the
distortion associated with taxation).
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development expenses,199 it might raise welfare. The question-a dif-
ficult one-is whether adding an additional method of government
revenue generation will tend to increase or decrease efficiency.
An important consideration is the effect of the government's
power on rent-seeking activities. Because auctions limit the windfalls
that private parties will receive, they will generate less rent seeking
than pure government largesse. 2°° Since the auction itself provides a
mechanism for dissipating rents, additional rent dissipation will occur
only to the extent that a particular party will benefit from an auction.
With patent extension auctions, patentees will generally be eager to
lobby for auctions only if they believe that they will win and have a
substantial advantage over other potential bidders. One such advan-
tage is continuous ownership; the patentee, unlike any third party, will
be able to capture the benefits of development activities that occur
during the original patent term, including the benefits realized dur-
ing the original term and the extension period. Thus, although other
factors might also give a patentee an advantage over third parties,20'
patentees will have a greater incentive to lobby for patent extension
auctions when the costs of underdevelopment are high. The lobbying
expenses are still a social cost,20 2 but at least there is a rough correla-
tion between cases in which patentees will seek extension auctions
and cases in which such extension auctions will be socially beneficial.
B. Patentee-Decreed Patent Extension Auctions
Giving a patentee the exclusive power to seek a patent extension
auction can reduce the social cost of lobbying expenses. The obvious
danger is that the patentee will inefficiently invoke the auction option.
Patentees might anticipate that they will have some advantage over
other bidders, but this advantage might not be the advantage of con-
tinuous ownership. For example, the patent might be complementary
to another patent in the patentee's portfolio, or the patent might help
the patentee extend its monopoly into another market.20 3 Ideally, the
patentee would elect the option only when the advantage that it en-
199 The more common situation in which taxes may promote internalization involves
negative externalities. See generally ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE
(Transaction Publishers 2002) (1920) (providing the classic defense of using taxation to
internalize negative externalities). A patent extension achieved through an auction may
allow internalization of the positive externalities of patent development.
200 Cf Abramowicz, supra note 198, at 209-10 (discussing the typical problem of rent
seeking in the current patent context).
201 See infra notes 203, 209 and accompanying text.
202 See Abramowicz, supra note 198, at 210.
203 For an overview of how the owner of an intellectual property right might seek to tie
the protected product with another to extend the owner's market power, see Troy Paredes,
Comment, Copyright Misuse and Tying: Will Courts Stop Misusing Misuse?, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J.
271, 298-302 (1994).
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joys is attributable to ownership continUity.20 4 A relatively simple auc-
tion regime can provide a reasonable assurance that this ideal is
achieved. Part III.B.1 describes this mechanism, Part III.B.2 elabo-
rates particular details, and Part III.B.3 considers some variations.
1. The Mechanism
The auction mechanism would work as follows: Congress would
specify a field of technology, or perhaps even individual patents, in
which patent underdevelopment seems a likely problem. In theory,
Congress might apply the auction mechanism to the entire patent sys-
tem, but at least initially, much more narrow experimentation would
be preferable. In the authorized field, a patentee at any time would
be able to request an auction for a patent extension and to specify,
perhaps within limits, the length of time of that extension. The paten-
tee initially would not bid in the auction. After third parties have had
a chance to bid, the patentee would then be given an opportunity to
purchase the patent extension for a set markup over the top bid. For
example, if the statute authorizing patent extension auctions declared
the markup to be 25%, and the high bid at the auction was
$1,000,000, then the patentee would have an opportunity to purchase
the patent extension for $1,250,000.215 If the patentee declined the
purchase, then the high bidder would win the auction, paying an
amount equal to the bid of the second-highest bidder.20 6
An auction that results in transference of the patent to a third
party might be a social failure, for such auctions would increase dead-
weight loss without increasing the incentive to develop the patent
within the original patent term.20 7 The third parties must, however,
204 A patent extension might be useful for reasons other than patent underdevelop-
ment, such as when the patentee has special expertise in price discriminating and, thus, in
improving efficiency. See generally Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13
J.L. & ECON. 293, 301-02 (1970) (explaining how price discrimination can improve effi-
ciency in the provision of public goods). Here, however, I have focused solely on whether
an auction mechanism might solve the patent underdevelopment problem.
205 A variant would require the patentee to submit a sealed bid at the same time third
parties submit sealed bids and then would award the patentee the patent if and only if its
sealed bid exceeded the next highest by at least the markup. In this regime, third parties
could offer bids as percentages of the patentee's bid tip to a specified maximum. This
might be useful if third parties are not expected to have good information about the pat-
ent's value. A third party would then need to consider only the extent to which the patent
would be less valuable to it as a result of the lack of ownership continuity and the transac-
tion costs associated with selling the patent back to the patentee after the expiration of the
original term.
206 See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing the second-price sealed bid
auction approach).
207 Conceivably, auctions could reduce the cost of that failure. For example, the gov-
ernment might use the auction mechanism suggested by Michael Kremer. See Michael
Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137,
1146-48 (1998). Under that mechanism, an auction would be used to value a patent, but
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have some incentive to participate in the process to ensure a competi-
tive bidding regime. The difficult task is to ensure that patentees have
incentives to call for auctions only when they actually expect a strong
probability of winning, while at the same time ensuring at least some
reasonable third-party bids. Ordinarily, patentees will already have
some incentive not to call for auctions that they do not expect to win.
They might be worse off with the patent in the hands of a third party
than with the patent in the public domain, particularly where the pat-
entee wishes to sell directly a good or service represented by the pat-
ent. It would be straightforward to add additional incentives not to
call an auction, such as requiring a patentee to pay the high bidder a
penalty percentage of its high bid if the patentee declines the option
to purchase the patent extension. 208 This would have the additional
benefit of increasing auction competitiveness, which would likewise
increase if the high bidder received a percentage of the purchase
price when the patentee does exercise the patent extension option.
2. The Details
a. Post-Auction Sales of Term Extensions
Two rules are essential for cases in which a third party purchases
the patent term extension:
First, the purchaser cannot be allowed to sell the patent exten-
sion to the original patentee during the original patent term. Other-
wise, even where a patentee is clearly the most efficient patent owner,
a third party's bid will be based on its estimate of the original paten-
tee's valuation. The difference between what the original patentee is
willing to pay and what the third party is willing to pay would be attrib-
utable to the anticipated combined bargaining costs of the transfer
negotiation. Instead, the auction mechanism will work appropriately
only if the difference derives from the benefit of development within
the original patent term. To force the third party to consider only its
own valuation of the patent, and not the possible increased benefits
from patent development, the third party must be barred from resel-
would consummate with only some low positive probability. See id. at 1147. With high
probability, the price signals from the auction would help derive a value to compensate the
patent holder who, in this case, is the winner of the patent extension at the initial auction.
See id. There are obvious affinities between my proposal and Kremer's: both seek to use
information from bids for patents at auction to overcome problems with the patent system.
See id. The ends, however, are opposite. Kremer's proposal is potentially useful when
there are efficiency advantages to placing a patent in the public domain, while the ap-
proach described here is useful when there are efficiency reasons to prevent a patent from
falling into the public domain. They could, however, be combined to account for cases in
which the patentee's initial decision turns out to be mistaken.
208 The optimal markup would decline with an increase in the penalty percentage be-
cause the penalty percentage would make the option of declining the extension less
attractive.
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ling the patent during the patent term. Likewise, the original paten-
tee should be prevented from selling the remainder of the original
patent term to the purchaser of the extension period.
Second, the purchaser should be allowed to sell the patent exten-
sion to the original patentee after the original patent term has expired
or once expiration is so close that it would be too late for the original
patentee to engage in further meaningful patent development within
the patent term. This rule ensures that the user who values the patent
most-the highest-valuing user-holds the patent. It also assures that
the difference between the original patentee's valuation and the third
party's valuation derives from the benefit of development of the pat-
ent within the original patent term and not from some other factor
that makes the patent particularly valuable to the patentee. Critically,
this rule will not undermine the previous one. A patentee who loses a
patent extension auction ordinarily will not be willing to undertake
development costs with the hope of recouping them by buying the
patent extension after the original patent term expires. Because de-
velopment would make the patent more valuable, the patentee would
have to pay the extension-right holder for the increase in value attrib-
utable to the patentee's own development expenses.
Suppose, for example, that a patent needs no further develop-
ment, but that it is twice as valuable to the patentee than to the high-
est-valuing third-party bidder. Because no further development is
needed, the unique value to the patentee must come from market
power during the patent extension term; for example, such unique
value may come from the fact that the patent will be more valuable as
part of a patent portfolio than alone.20 9 If a third party could not sell
the patent extension back to the original patentee during or after the
original patent term, then the third party would not incorporate this
unique value into its bid. Thus, as long as the markup was less than
100% (and, in the interest of simplicity, disregarding the possibility of
penalties), the patentee would win the patent extension but for rea-
sons contrary to the goals of the patent extension auction system.
However, if the third party anticipates being able to sell the patent
extension back to the original patentee, the third party will also antici-
pate being able to capture the full amount of the markup and thus
will bid as much as the patentee. Anticipating this result, the patentee
will not call for an auction in the first place.
209 See generally Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 29 (arguing that patents may be
more valuable as part of patent portfolios than alone).
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b. Determination of the Markup
Aside from overseeing the auction and determining whether con-
tracts assigning patents meet the above rules, the government would
not be involved in the auction mechanism. Patent holders would have
an incentive to call for and, ultimately, win an auction only where the
benefits of patent ownership continuity are sufficiently great to justify
paying the markup. The challenge for the government is determining
the size of that markup. If the markup is too low, then relatively small
benefits from continuity will lead to auctions even if significant dead-
weight loss results. Our existing patent system, however, which does
not allow extensions, is tantamount to a system with an infinite
markup. Initially, a government creating a system of patent extension
auctions might start with a very high markup so that only a few auc-
tions would be held and studies could assess whether the extensions
benefited the public. Then, if patent extension auctions appeared to
increase public welfare, the government might gradually lower the
markup. Conceivably, the government might eventually offer differ-
ent markups for different patents, since the amount of deadweight
loss might vary depending on factors such as the ease with which price
discrimination can be accomplished. Such a system has its drawbacks,
however, since individuation would encourage rent seeking.
A simple algebraic argument suggests that an approximation of
the optimal markup is 25%. Let m represent the markup, let v re-
present the total value of the patent extension to the highest-valuing
third-party user, let s represent the social benefit of increased ability to
develop the patent, and let p represent the proportion of this benefit
that the patentee will privately capture. The patentee will call for an
auction if ps > mv. The government would like to induce an auction if
and only if s > d, where d represents the deadweight loss resulting
from the patent extension. Thus, the government should set m = pd/
v. With linear demand, d/v = 0.5.210 Meanwhile, the patentee is un-
likely to be able to price discriminate perfectly, but one can reasona-
bly assume that the additional producer surplus attributable to the
development will be equal to the additional consumer surplus, so that
p = 0.5. Therefore, the government should set m = 0.25 to reach an
optimal result. To be sure, these assumptions are gross simplifica-
tions, and the analysis, which assumes perfect information on the part
of the patentee, disregards the possibility that the patentee will ever
need to pay a fine.
210 See, e.g., Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize
the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HAR. J.L. & TECH. 123, 132 n.21 (1997) ("When
facing linear demand and zero marginal cost, a monopolist maximizes profit by selling to
exactly half the consumers. Geometrically, this means that [consumer surplus] = [dead-
weight loss] = (0.5 * [producer surplus]).").
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3. The Variations
a. Alternative Auction Currencies
We have assumed so far that the auction currency would be cash
payable to the government. In a separate paper addressing the possi-
bility that auctions of rights to inventive fields might serve as alterna-
tives to the current patent system, I noted that such auctions might
use different currencies. 2 11 The same argument applies to the patent
extension auctions contemplated here. A benefit of the cash-to-gov-
ernment approach is, of course, that it provides the government with
revenue. Alternative auction currencies, however, could potentially
help advance specific goals of the patent extension auction system.
This section considers two alternative auction currencies. Addition-
ally, the government could hold a "multiple currency auction" using
some formula to aggregate bids that span different components.
First, the currency might be cash to be invested in development
activities, rather than cash to be paid to the government. If the patent
holder intends to engage in substantial development activity during
the time remaining in the original patent term, then the patent
holder will outspend the high bidder, who would not have incentives
to spend money until after the patent term. Where the patent holder
would spend significantly more on development than would any third
party, the additional deadweight loss from a patent extension is worth
suffering. This approach would encourage more total investment in
patent development than the cash-to-government approach. A weak-
ness of this approach is that it limits the auction winner's flexibility if
changes in circumstances make further patent development inadvisa-
ble. In addition, for this approach to work, the government would
need to be able to assess whether funds are, in fact, being spent on
development activities.
Second, if injunctive relief were disallowed during patent exten-
sion periods, the auction currency could be patent damages. Ian Ay-
res and Paul Klemperer have noted that, in the absence of
injunctions, lowering patent damages effectively reduces the price pat-
entees will charge for their inventions. 21 2 Patentees will set prices an-
ticipating the possibility of unauthorized competition, and patentees
and licensees negotiate in the shadow of potential lawsuits. The win-
ning bidder in the initial auction therefore might be the party that
offers to accept the smallest proportion of patent damages. The origi-
nal patentee would receive a patent extension only if she agreed to
211 See Michael Abramowicz, Patent Auctions 43-44 (2005) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
212 See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MIcH.
L. REv. 985, 1028-31 (1999).
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accept an even smaller proportion of patent damages. This system
would therefore require a markdown, rather than a markup. The
benefit of this approach is that lower prices reduce deadweight loss,
partly offsetting the concern that patent term extensions will result in
continued high prices for consumers.
A problem with this approach is that agreements to charge low
prices may lead to patent underdevelopment. If the goal is to en-
courage development, then allowing a patentee to capture only a
small proportion of surplus can be counterproductive. Even more
troubling is that a third party could offer the best bid by agreeing to
only nominal damages, and a patentee could accept even more nomi-
nal damages but then not further develop the patent. Thus, a bid for
a low price would likely need to be accompanied by some form of cash
payment or investment commitment so that the level of patent dam-
ages would not be too low. Increasing the amount of cash committed
decreases the danger that the auction currency itself will reintroduce
the problem of patent underdevelopment but increases the likelihood
of deadweight loss. Alternatively, the auction structure could be re-
versed, with a relatively low, fixed level of patent damages accompany-
ing the patent term extension and bidders offering cash or investment
commitments.2' 3
b. Repeated Extensions
Regardless of the auction currency, the process might be re-
peated iteratively. As the end of the patent extension period ap-
proaches, the patentee will consider whether to demand another
auction and seek another extension. 21 4 The patentee should have
roughly appropriate incentives in determining when to request a pat-
ent extension auction and how long an extension to request. Each
time, the patentee will have an incentive to wait long enough to en-
sure that additional development will be needed, but also to seek an
extension early enough to ensure that it will be able to recoup its de-
velopment expenses. Similarly, the patentee will want a relatively
short patent extension term so that it does not end up paying a pre-
mium for a portion of the patent term where it has no competitive
advantage over the victorious third party. But the patentee will also
want a relatively long patent extension term to ensure that it will own
the patent long enough to recoup its development expenses. While
213 Ayres and Klemperer provide a general argument for lowering the level of patent
damages and for limiting injunctive relief, but a jurisdiction seeking to implement their
proposal could set the price level without holding an auction. See id.
214 Conceivably, a third party that won an auction could also seek another patent ex-
tension. The third party's victory, however, would ordinarily signal that the benefits of
ownership continuity were not as high as the patentee thought they might be.
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this does not prove that the patentee's privately optimal decision will
be socially optimal, the balance of considerations likely places the pat-
entee in a better position than the government to determine when
patent extension auctions should occur and how long term extensions
should be.
c. Copyright Term Extensions
The result of a system where patent term extensions are repeat-
edly auctioned would be a regime of indefinitely renewable patents
215
analogous to the regime of indefinitely renewable copyrights sug-
gested by Landes and Posner. 216 There are differences between the
two regimes. In the patent extension auction system, the price of re-
newal would vary with the value of the intellectual property right, and
the in'ellectual property right holder would generally have an incen-
tive to seek renewal only when it would be socially beneficial. Auction-
ing copyright term extensions through any means would accomplish
the first of these two goals but would not necessarily accomplish the
second. While auctioning copyright extensions through a method
analogous to the patent term extension auctions described here might
attempt to accomplish the second goal, underdevelopment is not
likely to be a great concern in copyright law because the copyright
owner can obtain a new copyright on a derivative of the original
work.217 Moreover, especially since the enactment of the Copyright
Term Extension Act in 1998,218 the copyright term is sufficiently long
that a copyright holder will probably spend little marketing the origi-
nal work, and there will be little need for commercial experiments to
test the public's demand for the original.
In copyright, there is thus less danger of underdevelopment than
overdevelopment, producing what Landes and Posner refer to as
"congestion externalities." 219 For example, Landes and Posnerjustify
215 Mark Lemley interprets the theory that intellectual property rights may ensure the
efficient management of property to imply that "there seems little reason to terminate that
right after a period of years." See Lemley, supra note 75, at 131. Indeed, my analysis sug-
gests that a definite termination may not be optimal. Lemley might overstate the point,
however, because those who advance what he refers to as "ex post" justifications for intel-
lectual property concede that intellectual property rights have costs, including deadweight
loss. See id. at 129. The challenge, which I seek to meet here, is to find a way to extend
patents just long enough to allow for efficient management and development of the prop-
erty rights up until the point where the cost of further extensions would exceed their
benefit.
216 See Landes & Posner, supra note 189.
217 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
218 Id. §§ 302-304.
219 Landes & Posner, supra note 189, at 484-88; see Michael Abramowicz, A Theoy of
Cofpyright's Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. Rav. 317 (2005) (arguing that
the derivative right is justified in part because it reduces the number of derivative works
made).
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the long copyright term based on a concern that if Mickey Mouse
were in the public domain, different authors might use him in differ-
ent ways, thus blurring the character and reducing the total social
value that the character produces. 220 A slightly different mechanism,
in conjunction with a shorter initial copyright term, might provide an
efficient way of allowing long copyright terms only in cases where con-
gestion externalities are an issue. For example, the initial auction
might be for three different licenses to the copyrighted work. The
copyright holder would then have an opportunity to keep the copy-
right without giving away a license by paying an amount equal to some
multiple of the average of the top three bids. The copyright holder's
valuation is likely to be particularly high relative to the bids for li-
censes when the competition among the licensees poses a risk of over-
saturating the public or causing inconsistent development of the
copyrighted work.
CONCLUSION
Although intellectual property commentators have long dis-
cussed the optimal length of the patent term, they have assumed that
the existing term is long enough to give patentees sufficient incentives
to commercialize their patented inventions. Two new developments,
one empirical and one theoretical, make such assumptions problem-
atic. First, patents are increasingly granted on embryonic inventions,
particularly in the field of genomics. Such inventions may require
study for a period longer than the patent term. Second, economic
models of intellectual property suggest that inventors may acquire pat-
ents for their option value at a relatively early stage of development.
By the time a patent option would be worth exercising if most of the
patent term remained, so little time may remain that commercializa-
tion would not be feasible.
The patent system includes some mechanisms that significantly
limit the underdevelopment problem. First, by imposing substantial
requirements for patenting, the patent system reduces the proportion
of expenses that need to be made after patenting. The patent un-
derdevelopment concern thus provides a counterweight to the pros-
pect theory of patents, which argues that patents should be granted
early. Second, improvement patents can effectively extend the patent
term. However, they may not be available for some types of develop-
ment activity, including scientific experimentation, commercial test-
ing and marketing, and research producing subpatentable inventions.
220 See Landes & Posner, supra note 189, at 487-88 ("Not only would the public rapidly
tire of Mickey Mouse, but his image would be blurred, as some authors portrayed him as a
Casanova, others as catmeat, others as an animal-rights advocate, still others as the hen-
pecked husband of Minnie.").
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As a result, patent extensions, though probably welfare decreasing for
the vast majority of inventions, might enhance social welfare for a
small subset.
Auctions for patent term extensions provide a possible solution to
the patent underdevelopment problem. Under this approach, a pat-
entee would be able to call for such an extension before the end of
the patent term. The patentee, however, would need to offer a bid
substantially exceeding that of the runner-up to win the extension,
and a patentee who calls for, but does not win, an auction would pay a
fine. This approach will result in patent extensions only where the
value of continuity of patent ownership is relatively high. These will
be cases in which the patentee would like to make investments during
the remainder of the original patent term that would pay off primarily
in the extension period and, thus, where the degree of patent un-
derdevelopment would otherwise be high.
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